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ABSTRACT
Most technical standards-development organizations (SDOs) have adopted internal policies
embodying “due process” criteria such as openness, balance of interests, consensus decision
making and appeals. These requirements arise from numerous sources including antitrust law,
international trade law, public procurement requirements and institutional norms. Yet balance
criteria lack a generally-accepted definition and the manner in which they are implemented
varies, sometimes dramatically, among SDOs. Recently, there has been a renewed interest in the
principle that SDOs should ensure a balance of interests among their stakeholders, including in
the development of intellectual property rights policies. This article explores the origins and
meaning of the balance requirement for SDOs and identifies distinct modalities in which balance
requirements are imposed, as well as existing antitrust and competition law requirements
surrounding SDO balance.

* Baron is a Senior Research Associate at Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, Center on Law,
Business, and Economics (CLBE). Research at CLBE has benefited from financial support by Qualcomm, among
other sponsors. Contreras is a Presidential Scholar and Professor of Law at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney
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the other participants at the European University Institute, Conversation On Patents, Innovation And Competition,
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upon and consolidates the authors’ prior work on SDO balance: Jorge L. Contreras, Understanding ‘Balance’
Requirements for Standards Development Organizations, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Sept. 2019, and Justus Baron &
Pierre Larouche, Antitrust and Balance of Interests in Standards Development – Lessons From NSS Labs v.
Symantec, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Sept. 2019.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Non-governmental standards-development organizations (SDOs) have operated in the United
States and Europe for more than a century, serving as neutral fora for the collaborative
development of technical interoperability standards and protocols. In order to achieve broad
acceptance and legitimacy of their standards, SDOs have long sought some degree of “balance of
interests” among different interests, typically encouraging active participation by product
manufacturers, product users and unaffiliated experts. 1 Conversely, courts and antitrust
enforcement agencies have come to view a lack of balance among participants in standard-setting
activities as undesirable and sometimes of legal concern. Accordingly, balance requirements have
been embodied in the policies of most major SDOs – one of several “due process” features that,
along with openness, consensus decision making and an appeals process, seek to ensure the overall
fairness of the standardization process. Similarly, a significant number of public regulations list
balance among the procedural features of standards development that SDOs are expected to follow.
Today, balance requirements are an accepted feature of SDO organization, and most stakeholders
view them as desirable.2
But what does “balance of interests” mean in an SDO comprised of self-selected volunteer
participants – both individuals and organizations – and how can (and should) it be achieved? In
this article, we explore the history of SDO balance requirements, as well as the legal and
institutional implications of different interpretations of this important principle.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Part II, we discuss the origins of
balance requirements in the international standardization movement, then move in Parts III and IV
to chart the development of balance requirements in the United States and the European Union. In
Part V, we offer a comparative analysis of different balance requirements along two different axes:
the types of interests that should be balanced, and the level of balance that SDOs are expected or
required to seek or achieve.

1

JOANNE YATES & CRAIG N. MURPHY, ENGINEERING RULES: GLOBAL STANDARD SETTING SINCE 1880 at 9, 194
(2019).
2
See Justus Baron, Jorge Contreras, Martin Husovec & Pierre Larouche, Making the Rules: The Governance of
Standard Development Organizations and their Policies on Intellectual Property Rights, JRC Science for Policy
Report EUR 29655 at 119 (Nikolaus Thumm, ed., Mar. 2019) [hereinafter JRC Report] (89% of surveyed
stakeholders believed that “SDOs should ensure balance among different types of stakeholders when considering a
significant new policy or policy change”).
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ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF BALANCE REQUIREMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION

Standards generally fall into one of three broad categories: measurement, performance and
compatibility.3 Measurement standards establish uniform systems for measuring quantities of all
kinds – length, mass, speed, temperature, electrical resistance, the cut, clarity and carat ratings of
gemstones, etc. Measurement standards are among the oldest standards in the world, and have
traditionally been developed by governmental actors seeking to facilitate trade and commerce both
within and outside of their jurisdictions.4 Performance standards establish minimum criteria for a
product, service, individual or organization – from automotive emissions to food storage to legal
competency; standards like these are intended to achieve goals such as health and safety,
environmental protection and public trust. As such, they have often been established by
governmental actors, but also by trade and professional associations.
Our focus is mostly on the third category – standards that are intended to promote the
compatibility of products and services offered by different vendors. Government-sponsored efforts
to standardize industrial components such as parts for firearms and railroad tracks have been
documented since the late eighteenth century. 5 But large-scale movement toward the
standardization of industrial components, which was largely a private sector phenomenon, did not
occur until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Commercial pressure toward
standardization arose from two related but distinct sources. In the first, dominant entities such as
the U.S. military, Ford Motor Co. and AT&T found it beneficial for their suppliers to produce
parts that were standardized and interchangeable – features that enabled more efficient
procurement and reduced production costs. The second emerged from a desire for greater
international harmonization and cooperation among groups of engineers – the “international”
standardization movement documented by JoAnne Yates and Craig Murphy in their
comprehensive history Engineering Rules.6 The earliest balance requirements of SDOs originate
in this movement.
A.

EARLY INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION ORGANIZATIONS

The earliest standardization organizations in Europe and the United States arose at the end of
the 19th century from private sector initiatives.7 This early standardization movement was largely
independent of government control. Lacking formal legal means of enforcing compliance with
their standards, early advocates of international standardization saw the need to involve both the
manufacturers of standardized goods and their customers in standardization, to ensure that
standards responded to their respective interests. As a result, when the International Association
3

See, e.g., ANDREW L. RUSSELL, OPEN STANDARDS AND THE DIGITAL AGE: HISTORY, IDEOLOGY, AND NETWORKS
17-18 (2014).
4
See, e.g., STEVEN M. SPIVAK & F. CECIL BRENNER, STANDARDIZATION ESSENTIALS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 711 (2001) (briefly noting historical examples); KEN ALDER, THE MEASURE OF ALL THINGS: THE SEVEN-YEAR
ODYSSEY AND HIDDEN ERROR THAT TRANSFORMED THE WORLD (2014) (history of the creation of the metric system
of weights and measures during the 18th century).
5
See SPIVAK & BRENNER, supra note 4, at 10-12.
6
YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1.
7
For an overview of the historical development of international standardization, see id.
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for Testing Materials (IATM) – the first international association created solely for setting
voluntary industry standards – was created in 1898, it established a policy “that its Technical
Committees should be nearly equally divided between producers and consumers.” 8 IATM’s
policies created a widely observed precedent and influenced practices in international standards
organizations, as well as national and regional organizations in the United States and Europe.9 We
refer to these early SDO requirements to balance the interests of different groups, most notably
producers and users of the standardized goods, as “traditional” balance requirements.
One of the oldest international standards organization still in existence, the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), was formed in 1906. 10 It appears that, at the founding
conference of the IEC, debate arose as to membership, and delegates chose to expand beyond
professional engineers to include representatives of manufacturers, in order to ensure the success
of standardization efforts.11 The need for a balanced membership was therefore very much on
the minds of the national professional electrical engineering associations as they created the IEC.
B.

BALANCE REQUIREMENTS AND THE WTO TBT AGREEMENT

Despite their origins in international standardization, balance of interests requirements in
standards development subsequently evolved at the national and regional levels (see Parts III and
IV). One reason for this shift is that there are few regulatory instruments at international level
capable of imposing procedural principles on SDOs. One exception is the World Trade
Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the “TBT Agreement”).12 The
TBT Agreement largely mirrors the provisions of the 1979 Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement
made under the previous Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).13
Each TBT Agreement includes provisions designed to ensure that national standards will not be
used as non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and services. Like the rest of the WTO Agreement
resulting from the Uruguay Round, the TBT Agreement was adopted in 1994. Unlike its
predecessor, it included an annex titled “Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption, and
Application of Standards”.14
The Code of Good Practice focuses on aspects of standards development that are directly
relevant to international trade. It does not provide for a balance of interests requirement or
comparable process principles. In 2000, however, the Code was supplemented by a decision of the
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade that governs the TBT Agreement, which invites SDOs
to adopt “procedures for soliciting input from a wide range of interests”, and notes that “Bodies
operating with open, impartial and transparent procedures, that afford[] an opportunity for
consensus among all interested parties” are more likely to develop effective standards that do not
8

YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 43 (quoting Proceedings of the ASTM 1, no. 7 (1900), p.76).
See id. at 45 (“Similar membership policies would be adopted by other standardizing bodies subsequently, as
would the policies around balance of producers and consumers of materials.”)
10
YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 66-67
11
Id. at 69-71.
12
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 120.
13
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 1186 U.N.T.S. 276,
14
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, supra, note 12, Annex 3 at p. 138.
9
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create unnecessary obstacles to trade. 15 This decision emphasizes the impartiality of the
standardization process and its openness to a wide range of interests, but does not require SDOs to
balance representation of different interest categories.
Additionally, in 1994 - concurrently with the negotiation of the WTO Code of Good Practice
- the IEC and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) jointly developed their own
“Code of good practice for standardization”, ISO/IEC Guide 59:1994 (Guide 59). The membership
of ISO and IEC includes the National Standards Bodies (NSB) of a large number of countries, and
in many countries these bodies play a predominant role in standardization. Guide 59 may thus be
seen as an attempt by private organizations to contribute to discussions taking place within the
WTO by providing guidance on internationally respected standardization principles.
In particular, Guide 59 stipulates that the standardization processes of NSBs and other
standards organizations at the national level “should provide for balanced representation of interest
categories such as producers, buyers, consumers, etc.” Similar balance requirements apply to
NSBs representing the national interests in regional and international standardization. In a 2019
revision to Guide 59, the requirement to balance representation of different interest categories is
replaced with a less stringent requirement of “keeping an impartial and independent position by
providing the opportunity for representation by an appropriate balance of interests”.
The revised language brings the ISO Guide more closely in tune with the TBT Committee
Decision of 2000 and its call for impartiality and openness to participation by a wide range of
interests (as opposed to ensuring balanced representation of different categories).16 Furthermore,
it appears to reflect experience with balance requirements from standardization practice. More
detailed guidance by ISO to NSBs, also issued in 2019, states that “Quotas shall not be used,
because it’s not possible to make general rules for stakeholder balance, due to diversity of technical
sectors.”17 Through the interpretations of the TBT Committee Decision and the revised ISO/IEC
15

Decision of the TBT Committee on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and
Recommendations with relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the Agreement, Nov. 13, 2000, being Annex 4 to
the Second Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
G/TBT/9.
16
The intent to better align Guide 59 with WTO principles is stated in the foreword to the revised Guide: “The first
edition of this document predated the existence of both the WTO TBT Committee decision on principles for the
development of international standards, guides and recommendations (G/TBT/9, 13 November 2000) and the WTO
TBT Agreement’s Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards (Annex 3 of
the 1995 WTO TBT agreement). The purpose of this edition of this document is to provide recommendations for
implementing good standardization practices that are intended to support, but do not replace or supersede, the two
WTO TBT Committee documents.” ISO/IEC Guide 59(2019), Foreword, at v. With the revision, a “scope” has also
been added to Guide 59, stating that the Guide “provides recommended standardization practices that are intended
to support the application” of the TBT Code of Good Practice and the TBT Committee Decision of 2000.
17
ISO Guidance for ISO national standards bodies - Engaging stakeholders and building consensus, 2019; available
at https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/store/en/PUB100269.pdf (last consulted on December 28, 2020).
It is important to note that the guidance nonetheless does not abandon the principle of balanced representation:
“Attempts should be made to achieve balance with respect to the composition of the NMC [National Mirror
Committee]. Procedures should exist to safeguard against dominance by any stakeholder or stakeholder category”.
“Working group (WG) convenors are also responsible for ensuring a balance of interest and representation of all
relevant stakeholder categories in their WGs, and must issue a new call for experts in case of imbalance.”
Furthermore, balance of interests should be assessed with respect to appropriately defined interest “categories”; at
a minimum, SDO should consider the following categories and assess whether they have an interest in the standard:
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Guide 59, the concept of balance of interests is thus linked to keeping the standardization process
open to a variety of interests.
Conversely, the notion of balance is included in authoritative international interpretations of
“open standards”. For example, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), an
intergovernmental standards organization, defined “open standards” in 2005 in the context of
discussions regarding Intellectual Property Rights. One element of this definition is that the
standardization process should be “reasonably balanced” to ensure “that the process is not
dominated by any one interest group.”18
III.

A.

EVOLUTION OF SDO BALANCE REQUIREMENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES
EARLY SDO POLICIES – TRADITIONAL BALANCE REQUIREMENTS (PRE-1960)

Several prominent standardization efforts in the United States during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries were unilaterally undertaken by dominant organizations – the U.S.
military, which standardized thousands of mechanical components during World War I, Ford
Motor Co., which relied on standardized parts to enable the mass-production of automobiles, and
AT&T, the telephone monopoly that standardized many aspects of the U.S. telecommunications
infrastructure. 19 Yet the need for standards also became apparent in industries that were not
dominated by single players, but which required interconnection and compatibility among
competitors’ products and services – railroads, agricultural tools, electrical equipment, and
machinery of all kinds. Professional engineering societies emerged as loci for the development of
such standards.
Early on, these societies realized that standards development and adoption could be hampered
by conflicts among different interest groups, such as producers and users of standardized
products.20 In line with the example set by international organizations such as the IATM (and later
Industry and commerce, government, consumers, labour, academic and research bodies, standards application (e.g.
testing, certification, and accreditation bodies), and non-governmental organizations. This indicative list of interest
categories (especially in conjunction with the examples provided for further illustration) is a clear representation of
“societal balance”, as defined in Parts III and IV below.
18
“Definition of Open Standards”, Definition developed by IPR Ad Hoc Group and endorsed by TSAG at its
meeting on 11 November 2005, available at https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/ipr/Pages/open.aspx (last consulted on
December 28, 2020).
19
See Off. Tech. Assessment (OTA), Global Standards: Building Blocks for the Future at 42-44, OTA-TCT-512,
March 1992 [hereinafter OTA 1992 Report]; RUSSELL, supra note 3, at 97.
20
For example, the development of standards for railway tracks was hampered by conflicts between railway
companies, strongly represented in the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), and steel makers, which
dominated the American Institute for Mining Engineers (AIME). Both organizations developed their own standards,
reflecting the different companies’ preferences. Over time, the organizations developed processes for taking into
account both groups in order to produce successful standards. According to Yates and Murphy, “this focus on the
needs of producer and consumer would become a hallmark of private standard setting.” YATES AND MURPHY, supra
note 1, at 34. Another early field of standardization activities was electrical engineering. When the American
Institute of Electrical Engineers (AIEE), formed in 1884, first engaged in standardization, “the point of greatest
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the IEC), many early American standards organizations sought to balance the interests of
manufacturers, users, and other interest groups.21
While in many cases such balance was achieved informally by working group chairs and other
SDO leaders, more formal institutional requirements soon emerged. Beginning in 1920, the
American Engineering Standards Committee (AESC)22 – whose membership comprised AIEE,
ASME, ASTM, and other leading SDOs of the time along with several US government agencies
– required its Sectional Committees to maintain a balance of “producers, consumers, and general
interests.”23According to historian Andrew Russell, “much more than a trivial bureaucratic detail,
the mandate for balance between producers, consumers, and general interests was the foundational
principle and essence of the enterprise.”24
Over time, SDOs such as ASTM International adopted formal policies requiring that technical
committees have minimum levels of representation from defined stakeholder categories (usually
producers, “consumers”, i.e. users,25 and general interest).26 We refer to these numerical category
balancing requirements as “quotas”.
B.

TOWARD A U.S. NATIONAL STANDARDIZATION POLICY (1960S-70S)

During the 1960s and 1970s, there was significant growth in legislation requiring
environmental, health and safety standards in the U.S. Between 1970 and 1972, the U.S. federal
government created several agencies tasked with the development of regulatory standards,
including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health
contention was whether manufacturers should serve on the committee that would develop the standards. […] [AIEE
president Francis] Crocker, however, took the more pragmatic view that ‘there are three sides to the question, […],
the manufacturer, the purchaser and the consulting engineer, and leaving out any of them you do not necessarily
produce any better result’. […] After some discussion, AIEE appointed a Committee on Standardization composed
of men from all three of the constituencies.” Id. at 39.
21
The American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM) emerged from the American Section of the aforementioned
IATM; but acquired institutional independence in 1902 in particular over concerns by the IATM that the American
Section undermined the balance between producers and users required under IATM’s policies. By 1902, the new
ASTM had overcome concerns by “users” (notably railway companies) that the new ASTM would unilaterally favor
the interests of producers (steel makers), in great part by election of a president who represented a railroad
(“consumer”) company. YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 50
22
AESC was the precursor to today’s American National Standards Institute (ANSI).
23
Annual Report of the American Engineering Standards Committee 8 (1920) (cited in RUSSELL, supra note 3, at
71).
24
Id.
25
Early references to “producers and consumers” generally designate the opposing interests of two different groups
of companies, namely the manufacturers and the industrial/commercial users of standardized goods, such as
steelmakers and railways (e.g. RUSSELL, supra note 3, at 54; YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 50). Reference to
individual consumers is a much more recent phenomenon.
26
ASTM Intl., Regulations Governing ASTM Technical Committees § 3.1.1 (2018) (defining “balance” as
occurring “when the combined number of voting user, consumer, and general interest members equals or exceeds
the number of voting producer members”) and § 3.2.1 (requiring that “Balance must be achieved before any
standards are brought before a classified subcommittee or main committee for ballot”). See, also, Robert W.
Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting
Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1352-55 (1978) (observations of ASTM’s mandatory balance rules in
practice).
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Administration (OSHA). Facing increasing demand for standards with limited staff, agencies such
as OSHA increasingly sought to adopt voluntary consensus standards developed by private
SDOs.27
At that time, industry-developed standards were subject to criticism by consumer advocates
such as Ralph Nader, who contended that such standards were “essentially written by large
corporations to exclude competitors from the marketplace, […] misrepresent hazardous products
as safe, [and] boost sales while benefiting only the producer”. 28 Small businesses similarly
complained that standardization processes were imbalanced and dominated by the interests of large
corporations.29 In this context, both representatives of private standards organizations and their
critics called for a national standardization policy that would safeguard all interests affected by
proposed standards. 30 Some SDOs such as ASTM responded by providing funding for the
representation of consumer interests in its committees.31
In parallel, U.S. officials were pressing for inclusion of a Standards Code in the ongoing
negotiations of the Tokyo Round of the GATT, further increasing the perceived need for a
formalized U.S. standardization policy that could be used as a model in international
negotiations.32
During this period, there were several competing attempts to create a national standardization
policy in the U.S. On one hand, some proposed policies aimed at significantly expanding
government oversight of private standards development in order to accomplish several goals
including the assurance of a balance of interests in standards setting processes. The proposed
‘Voluntary Standards Accreditation Act’ aimed at creating a government-managed accreditation
program for standard developers. In support of this accreditation program, the proposed bill
provided that
The Federal Trade Commission is directed to establish rules which will bring about
uniform standards-development procedures assuring that the membership of standardsdevelopment committees be balanced so as to include and to insure effective representation
of all affected interests (e.g. consumers, small business concerns, users, manufacturers,

27

OTA 1992 Report, supra note 19, at 55.
Ralph Nader, Testimony on the Voluntary Standards Accreditation Act, Hearings on S825, Before the
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 1st Sess. 1977 (cited in OTA
1992 Report, supra note 27).
29
In 1968, a select committee on small businesses of the House of Representatives issued a report, including a
chapter on standardization. The chapter concludes that small business are typically underrepresented in the
processing of voluntary industrial standards: “Sponsoring bodies are typically not subjected to any requirement as
to the balance of their committees and subcommittees considering this standard. Often it would appear that small
businesses, consumers, and other affected interests are not represented.” Final Report of the Select Committee on
Small Businesses, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, pursuant to House Resolution 53, at 180.
30
See William T. Cavanaugh, Needed: A National Standards Policy, 5 ASTM STANDARDIZATION NEWS, June 1977.
31
Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1384. See Section III.C, infra.
32
YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 194-95.
28
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suppliers, distributors, employees, environmental and conservation organizations, state and
local procurement and code officials, labor, etc.).33

In spite of being introduced in Congress in both 1975 and 1977, the bill never advanced past
the committee stage.
With legislative proposals stalled, there were other attempts to create tighter government
oversight of private standardization. Prompted by individual grievances with specific voluntary
standards, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigated the procedures of voluntary
consensus standardization more generally, and in 1978 issued a Proposed Rule and Staff Report
finding that “standards development and certification activities have frequently caused or
contributed to substantial consumer and competitive injuries.”34 For the authors of the FTC staff
report, many of these concerns originated in insufficiently protective standardization processes:
“Standards development and certification organizations have not adequately protected all of the
interests affected by their activities. The procedures are capable of being, and have been,
manipulated by large or established firms at the expense of consumers, small firms, new entrants,
and others.”35
In its analysis, the FTC distinguishes between two distinct violations of proper standardization
process: ‘Dominant Firm Control’, in which a single firm or group of firms obtains an unfair
advantage through a biased standardization process, and ‘General Industry Control’, in which
“industry generally has greater influence in the development process than other groups, so
standards may be aimed at furthering industry interests.” 36 In the FTC’s view, existing SDO
balance requirements were insufficient to remedy this situation: “Although competing interests
purportedly receive balanced representation, certain interests are presumed to adequately represent
other interests. For example, consumers have been presumed to be adequately represented by
government officials, engineers, scientists, or academics” – a presumption that the FTC clearly
believed to be erroneous.37
To remedy these issues, the FTC’s 1978 staff report calls for new rules, which would treat the
development of standards in violation of clearly defined standardization process principles as “an
unfair method of competition and an unfair or deceptive act or practice” (i.e., behavior that the
FTC has the authority to prosecute under Section 5 of the FTC Act).38 In particular, the report
recommends that standards developers “provide to all persons equal opportunity to participate in
all phases of all standards proceedings”.39 The FTC staff thus appears to approve of an approach
to standards development rooted in openness, while not explicitly requiring balance and casting
doubt on the effectiveness of formal “classification schemes” intended to mandate balance (e.g.,
33

S.B. 825 and H.R. 8184, 95th Cong. (Voluntary Standards Accreditation Act), Sec. 102(b)(1)(c). Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States Senate, NinetyFifth Congress, First Session on S. 825, 1977.
34
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Standards and Certification – Proposed Rule and Staff Report 3 (1978) [hereinafter FTC
1978 Report].
35
Id. at 5.
36
Id. at 125.
37
Id. at 128
38
Id. at 289.
39
Id. at 318.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3806876

[Draft 18 Jan 2021]

BALANCE

Page 9

the quota requirements imposed by ASTM). 40 Nevertheless, in cases in which unrestricted
participation would become impractical, “the Standards developer may identify classes of persons
with the same or similar interests in the proceeding and select a representative or representatives
to exercise attendance and oral participation rights on behalf of each such class.”41
The proposed Voluntary Standards Accreditation Act and the FTC’s 1978 Staff Report were
strongly opposed by many industry representatives. Some standards organizations were
particularly adamant in their criticism of what they perceived as government encroachment on
their processes, with an ANSI representative complaining in a Senate hearing about the “misguided
and crusading FTC staff”. 42 In 1979, ANSI filed a lawsuit opposing adoption of the FTC’s
proposed rules.43
Other contemporary initiatives were significantly less intrusive, but nevertheless called for
greater government scrutiny of the balance of interests in standards development. Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS) Recommendation 78-4, adopted in 1978, focuses on the
use of existing voluntary consensus standards in federal regulation, and calls on federal agencies
to consider the “adequacy of the procedures followed by the organization preparing the standard
to assure that: The membership of the technical committee represents a broadly based and balanced
array of relevant interests, including, where appropriate, representatives of consumers, labor, small
business, and other affected groups, and no single interest has a dominating influence on the
committee”.44
At the same time, other efforts encouraged greater government deference to the judgment of
private SDOs regarding the appropriateness of standardization processes. This approach is
exemplified by the 1979 Trade Agreements Act,45 under which the U.S. Congress approved the
Tokyo Round of GATT, including its TBT Agreement.46 The Trade Agreements Act sets forth
the principle that - unlike many other countries - the interest of the U.S. in ISO and other private
international standards organizations should be represented by private sector organizations, but
provides no specific guidance how this representation should be carried out.47

40

Id. at 328 (“The concept of "balance" also may be perpetuated, as was observed above. The proposed rule does
not require balance, on the assumption that it is costly and impractical, and that even "balanced" voting does not
ensure a principled, nonharmful result. Never the less, within the confines of the written-comment and equalopportunity-of-participation requirements of S 457.5, the standards developer is free to run its committee and voting
as before.”) .
41
FTC Proposed Rule 457.5(c), Federal Register, Vol. 43, No. 236–Thursday, December 7, 1978
42
Hearings before the Subcommittee for Consumers of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate 96th Congress First Session on Oversight to Examine the Enforcement and Administrative
Authority of the FTC to Regulate Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices. September 27, 1979, at 289.
43
American National Standards Institute v. FTC, Civ. No. 79-1275 (D.D.C. 1979), filed May 9, 1979.
44
Admin. Conf. U.S., Recommendation 78-4: Federal Agency Interaction with Private Standard-Setting
Organizations in Health and Safety Regulation, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 1978 at 6 (1978) [hereinafter
ACUS Recommendation]. According to Professor Emily Bremer, the initial OMB Circular was the culmination of
a long interagency effort to codify the procurement practices of individual federal agencies (direct communication
with Contreras).
45
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub.L. 96–39, 93 Stat. 144, July 26, 1979 (codified at 19 U.S.C. Ch. 13).
46
Id. § 2503(a).
47
Id. § 2543(b)(2).
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BALANCE REQUIREMENTS AT ANSI (1960S-70S)

The American National Standards Institute (ANSI), formed in 1916, serves as the accreditation
body for SDOs that are developers of American National Standards.48 While ANSI accredits more
than 200 individual SDOs, not all U.S.-based SDOs are ANSI-accredited (notable omissions
including IETF and W3C), and only few foreign-based SDOs are accredited.49
Concerns over the representation of consumers and other societal groups underlying the
different regulatory and legislative efforts of the late 1970s were shared by ANSI and many ANSIaccredited SDOs. 50 In response, these SDOs implemented a variety of programs intended to
increase the voice of consumers in standardization activities, ranging from informal “consumer
sounding boards” to direct participation by technically qualified consumer representatives on SDO
technical committees.51 In 1967, ANSI created a Consumer Council to review and comment upon
standards affecting consumers prior to their approval. 52 Underwriters Laboratories created a
similar council.53
In addition to outreach to underrepresented groups, in 1974 ANSI significantly expanded its
oversight of due process principles in the development of American National Standards when it
first issued its Procedures for Management and Coordination of American National Standards.54
Section 4.8.3 of the Procedures formulated explicit requirements to balance the composition of
American National Standards committees among representatives of different interest groups.
Notably, it distinguished between product and safety standards committees. Participants in product
standards committees were classified as representing producer, retailer or user interests, as well as
the general interest (any party having an interest other than those covered by the other categories).
Safety standards committees were required to classify participants into a significantly larger set of
interest categories, also including employers, employees, government and consumers, among
others. In addition, the balance requirement for safety standards committees was more stringent:
whereas in product standards committees, no category should have a majority; in safety standards
committees, no interest category should have more than one third of the committee membership.
This distinction suggests that an imbalance between industry and other interests (such as
consumers and employees) was seen as less acceptable in the case of safety than product standards.

48

Jorge L. Contreras, Origins of FRAND Licensing Commitments in the United States and Europe in CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS, 149, 162-63 (Jorge
L. Contreras, ed., 2017).
49
ANSI, ANSI Membership Roster, https://myaccount.ansi.org/Membership/membershipRoster.aspx (visited Jan.
15, 2021).
50
Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1383-86.
51
Id. at 1384.
52
Id. at 1385. The ANSI Consumer Interest Forum, which exists today, is the successor to the Consumer Council.
See ANSI, Consumer Interest Forum (CIF), https://www.ansi.org/consumer_affairs/cic?menuid=5#overview.
53
Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1385, n. 157.
54
ANSI, Procedures for Management and Coordination of American National Standards (1974) [hereinafter ANSI
Procedures (1974)]. Prior to this, Professor Hamilton observes that ANSI “made no systematic attempt to ensure
compliance with [its] procedural requirements”). Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1346.
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In order to enforce this balance requirement, each committee secretariat was required to submit
an initial list of committee members to its standards management board for approval. The board’s
approval of the committee composition would be based, among other criteria, on the fact “that,
where applicable, substantial balance [as defined above] exists among voting representatives”.55
A similar, albeit less specific, balance requirement also applies to other standards developers
seeking ANSI accreditation: the rules specify that accreditation of standards organizations will be
based on compliance with criteria including “Balanced membership on each standards committee
among those interests having potential concern with the specific project.” 56
These developments in private SDOs played a role in the public debate over the need for
binding regulation regarding standardization. Writing in 1982, Professor Robert Hamilton
observes that the reason OSHA initially encountered problems in the use of private standards was
that it “uncritically accepted a large number of voluntary standards, some of which dated back fifty
years or more”.57 The use of such legacy standards was problematic not only because they may
have been technically outdated, but also because they were often developed using inadequate
processes. As Hamilton notes, “[t]wenty years ago the [standardization] process was much more
secretive and closed, and there was less emphasis on, and concern with, ‘balance’ and due
process.”58
This view is also reflected in testimony at the 1977 Senate hearings on the Voluntary Standards
Accreditation Act.59 Few objected to the relevance of the proposed procedural principles, but many
questioned the usefulness of a government accreditation program that would duplicate the effective
procedures in place for enforcing due process through ANSI.60

D.

BALANCE AND OMB CIRCULAR A-119 (1976-80)

In 1976, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) proposed a draft policy
in the form of a circular memorandum to the heads of executive agencies.61 The development of
55

ANSI Procedures (1974), supra note 54.
ANSI Procedures (1974), supra note 54. In 1977, a note was added to this section of the Procedures, specifying
that “The spirit and intent of 4.8.3 Classification of Representatives shall be used as a criterion”. ANSI, Procedures
for Management and Coordination of American National Standards (1977).
57
Robert W Hamilton, Prospects for the Nongovernmental Development of Regulatory Standards, 32 AM. U. L.
REV. 455, 464 (1982). See also STEPHEN J. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 102 (1982) (citing “serious
problems” with OSHA’s wholesale adoption of large numbers of industry standards, including the promulgation of
standards that were antiquated and inapplicable).
58
Hamilton, Prospects, supra note 57, at 465.
59
VSAA Hearings, supra note 33.
60
The Edison Electric Institute e.g. lamented that the bill would “destroy an established private sector organization
that is performing these functions effectively”. VSAA Hearings, supra note 32, at 617. The American Petroleum
Institute complained that “The effect of this bill would be to destroy the private sector American National Standards
Institute which has successfully performed its role in the voluntary standardization system. ANSI would be
supplanted by a government controlled "National Standards Management Board"”. Id. at 634. The National Society
of Professional Engineers stated that “The Federal Government should avoid competition and duplication with
ANSI”. Id. at 967.
61
Off. Mgt. Budget, Federal Interaction with Commercial Standards-Setting Bodies – Proposed OMB Circular, 41
Fed. Reg. 53723 (1976) [hereinafter OMB Circular Proposal 1976].
56
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this circular reflected the ongoing tension between permissive and interventionist tendencies in
U.S. standardization policy. 62 The 1976 draft called for increased use of voluntary industry
standards by government agencies.63 The reception of this circular by the private sector was largely
favorable but at least two government agencies had negative comments. 64 A 1977 version
attempted to account for concerns that were raised, notably by limiting government use of
voluntary industry standards to those issued by government-accredited standards bodies.65 This
version in turn was criticized by ANSI and other representatives of the private standardization
system.66 Over the following years, an Interagency Committee on Standards Policy deliberated
over these contentions,67 culminating in the release of the finalized policy as OMB Circular A-119
in January 1980.68
Circular A-119 establishes a Federal policy favoring the use of privately developed voluntary
standards in federal procurement activities:
It is the general policy of the Federal Government to … [r]ely on voluntary standards both
domestic and international with respect to Federal procurement, whenever feasible and
consistent with law and regulation pursuant to law;69

For purposes of the 1980 Circular, “voluntary standards” are defined as standards that are
established generally by private sector bodies and are available for use by any person or
organization, private or governmental. The term includes what are commonly referred to
as "industry standards" as well as "consensus standards" but does not include professional
standards of personal, conduct, private standards of individual firms, or standards
mandated by law,70

And “voluntary standards bodies”, the groups that “develop, establish, or coordinate voluntary
standards” are defined as
nongovernmental bodies which are broadly based, multi-member, domestic and
multinational organizations including, for example, non-profit organizations, industry
associations, and professional technical societies.71

In addition to adopting voluntary standards in their procurement functions, Circular A-119
encouraged federal agencies to participate in voluntary standards bodies.72 Standards bodies in
62

See, e.g., Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1438-39; ACUS Report, supra note 44, at 13.
OMB Circular Proposal 1976, supra note 61.
64
OTA 1992 Report, supra note 19, at 55; Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1439-41.
65
Off. Mgt. Budget, Proposed OMB Circular on Federal Interaction with Voluntary Consensus StandardsDeveloping Bodies, 43 Fed. Reg. 48 (1977).
66
OTA 1992 Report, supra note 19, at 56; Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1441-44.
67
Id. at 16
68
Off. Mgt. Budget, Federal Participation In the Development and Use of Voluntary Standards; Final Issuance, 45
Fed. Reg. 4326 (1980) [hereinafter OMB Circular A-119 (1980)].
69
OMB Circular A-119, supra note 68, at 4326 ¶ 5.a.
70
Id. ¶ 4.c.
71
Id. ¶ 4.e.
72
Id. ¶ 6.b.
63
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which federal agencies participated, however, were required to comply with certain minimum “due
process” criteria.73 These included, among other things, a “balance” requirement described as:
Inviting representatives of a broadly-based group of persons likely to have an interest in
the subject including, for example, consumers; small business concerns; manufacturers;
labor; suppliers; distributors; industrial, institutional and other users; environmental and
conservation groups; and State and local procurement and code officials.74

It is notable that this requirement of Circular A-119 places an emphasis on inviting
representatives of all interested stakeholder groups to participate in standardization, rather than
enforcing any particular mix or numerical quota of representatives from different stakeholder
categories, on one hand, or simply opening standardization activities to those who are interested,
on the other.
E.

THE REAGAN ERA: DEREGULATION AND FLEXIBILITY

With the election of Ronald Reagan to the White House in 1980 and his Administration’s
strong push toward deregulation of industry sectors from airlines to oil and gas,75 a permissive
approach toward private industry standardization prevailed in the U.S. government’s
standardization policy. In 1981, the President’s Task Force on Regulatory Relief reviewed OMB
Circular A-119 to determine whether it imposed unnecessary burdens on the public or private
sectors. 76 Following this review, a draft revision of the Circular was published in the Federal
Register on April 20, 1982.77 After a 60-day public comment period, during which 120 comments
were received, a final revision was published on October 26, 1982.78
The 1982 revision of the Circular introduced a number of substantive changes. Most
importantly, it expanded the scope of the Circular from federal procurement activity to both federal
procurement and regulatory activity. In addition, it eliminated the 1980 version’s enumerated “due
process” requirements for federal participation in voluntary standards organizations. In response
to public comments objecting to this deletion, OMB responded that “the imposition of the
mandatory procedures included in the previous editions of the Circular is inappropriate,
burdensome and costly and … peripheral to the fundamental aims of the Circular”.79 The U.S.
Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) supported the elimination of the “rigid” 1980 due
process requirements, but urged federal participants in SDOs to foster transparency and “open
standards proceedings” to “mitigate the substantial anticompetitive potential inherent in private

73

Id. ¶ 6.c. See also Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1346 (applying the term “due process” broadly to a set of
procedural protections).
74
OMB Circular A-119 (1980), supra note 68, ¶ 6.c.
75
See, generally, BREYER, supra note 57; Jefferson Decker, Deregulation, Reagan-Style, Regulatory Rev., Mar. 13,
2019.
76
cite
77
47 Fed. Reg. 16,919 (1982).
78
47 Fed. Reg. 49,496 (1982).
79
Id.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3806876

[Draft 18 Jan 2021]

BALANCE

Page 14

standards groups”.80 In its 1982 version, “with the due process requirements eliminated, OMB
Circular A-119 is strongly supported by the private sector”.81
In line with the revisions of OMB Circular A-119, the FTC in 1983 issued a Final Staff Report
on Standards and Certification, which marks significant changes from the FTC’s 1978 report.82
The Final Staff Report continues to recognize that “the failure of a standards organization to
provide procedural safeguards to those who may be adversely affected by its actions can constitute
an unfair method of competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act.”83 Nevertheless, the standard
that it establishes for these procedural safeguards falls short of the 1978 Proposed Rule’s
requirement that SDOs should offer all parties equal opportunity to participate at all stages of
standards development. Rather, the FTC considers that SDOs must provide affected producers
with notice, the opportunity to file a complaint to the SDO, and the right to a written response.84
This standard does not protect a minimum representation of certain interest categories. In line
with the 1978 Report, the Final Staff Report of 1983 reflects skepticism of some SDOs’ formal
balance requirements.85 Echoing some of the concerns expressed in the 1970s,86 the FTC notes
that quota schemes are seldom imposed on the working groups that actually formulate technical
standards documents, the classification of individuals into particular categories is often imperfect,
and there are ample other ways to skew the standardization process even when such requirements
exist.87
F.

THE EVOLUTION OF SDO APPROACHES TO BALANCE (1980S)

At the same time that the U.S. government adopted a significantly more lenient approach
toward SDOs, ANSI fundamentally revised its processes. The 1983 version of ANSI’s Procedures
for the Development and Coordination of National Standards takes a much more permissive
approach to balance of interests than prior versions. The strict balance requirement included in the
1974 and 1977 versions of the Procedures is replaced by an obligation to secure the
‘Representation of Interests’: “All directly and materially affected interests shall have the
opportunity for fair and equitable participation without dominance by any single interest”.88
The previously mandatory provisions for balanced committee composition are referred to as
“the historical criteria for balance”.89 The Procedures state that compliance with these ‘historical
criteria’ would usually satisfy the mandatory requirement to avoid dominance by any single
80

Letter dated June 22, 1982 from Ronald G. Carr, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, to
Donald E. Sowle, Admin. for Federal Procurement Policy, OMB (reproduced at 47 Fed. Reg. 49,496).
81
OTA 1992 Report, supra note 19, at 56
82
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Standards and Certification – Final Staff Report (1983) [hereinafter FTC 1983 Report].
83
Id. at 262.
84
Id. at 273.
85
Id. at 159 (“for several reasons, classification schemes do not always achieve their intended effect”).
86
See Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1354-55 (given the impossibility or impracticability of applying mandatory
balance rules to working groups, the putative balance protection at ASTM may, in fact, be illusory).
87
FTC 1983 Report, supra note 82, at 159-64.
88
Am. Natl. Standards Inst., Procedures for the Development and Coordination of National Standards (1983), at 4
89
Id.
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interest; nevertheless, such balanced composition is no longer systematically required or assessed
by ANSI: “Unless it is claimed by a directly and materially affected interest that a single interest
dominated the standards development process to the exclusion of fair and equitable consideration
of other viewpoints, no test for dominance is required.”90
The new version of the Procedures significantly weakens the requirement to seek balanced
representation of different interest categories. It does not, however, abandon this requirement
entirely, nor the underlying definition of balance as a situation where different interests are
sufficiently equally represented. The listed “interests” make it clear that “interests” still refer to
constituencies with aligned commercial interests in a standard, such as producers, users, etc.
Absence of dominance by a single interest thus differs from domination of standards processes to
the benefit of a single firm or single product, and refers to the absence of a situation in which a
single constituency would hold “a position or exercise of dominant authority, leadership, or
influence by reason of superior leverage, strength, or representation.” The revised procedures also
continue to distinguish between product and safety standards, where the criteria of balance are
more stringent for the latter.
ANSI’s procedures relating to balance again changed in 1987, when the name of the due
process requirement in question was changed back to “Balance”: “The standards development
process should have a balance of interests and shall not be dominated by any single interest
category.”91 In addition to explicitly stating that standards development processes should reflect a
balance of interests, the 1987 revision of the Procedures makes it more explicit that – in the context
of balance – the absence of dominance clearly refers to dominance by an interest category, rather
than dominance by a single actor or by a coordinated group of actors. Nevertheless, the 1987
revision did not reinstate the rigid process for verifying balanced representation that was present
in the 1970s. Balanced committee composition would “usually satisfy” the balance requirement;
however, balance in committee composition should only be tested if a directly and materially
affected party claimed that a single interest category dominated the standards development
process. The provisions with respect to balance of interests were not significantly modified in the
1993, 1997, and 1998 revisions of ANSI’s Procedures.92
G.

THE RISE OF CONSORTIA AND IT STANDARDIZATION (1980-90S)

ANSI’s more flexible approach towards assessing balance of interests in the development of
American National Standards may reflect the significant transformations in the standardization
ecosystem that were under way in the 1980s. In the context of the ever-increasing role of
information technology, alternative models for standardization – referred to broadly as consortia - emerged alongside, or even in explicit reaction to, more established SDOs. Consortia arose
because many firms viewed existing SDOs and their processes as inadequate for the complex

90

Id.
Am. Natl. Standards Inst., Procedures for the Development and Coordination of National Standards (1987).
92
Am. Natl. Standards Inst., Procedures for the Development and Coordination of National Standards (1993), Am.
Natl. Standards Inst., Procedures for the Development and Coordination of National Standards (1997), Am. Natl.
Standards Inst., Procedures for the Development and Coordination of National Standards (1998).
91
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interoperability needs of new information and communication technologies. 93 As two veteran
standardization practitioners observe, “SDOs are, by their nature, inclusive groups. As such, they
tend to be large, so their effectiveness diminishes. As the preferences of the group members
becomes more diverse, it becomes more difficult to reach consensus.”94 Consortia may offer a
simpler, yet unbalanced, alternative to more formal SDOs: “These must be small groups with a
relatively uniform preference structure in order to be effective. Almost by definition, these must
be exclusive groups”.95
In addition to consortia driven by corporate members, the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) introduced a new type of standards organization with its own institutional norms. IETF
arose in 1985 out of the U.S. government’s program to develop a resilient distributed computer
network during the 1960s and 1970s. As such, the original developers of the protocols underlying
that network were primarily from academia and government. The result of that program, the
ARPANET, eventually evolved into the Internet that we know today, and IETF emerged as the
principal global forum for the development of Internet standards.96
IETF embodies a model in which technical work is open to meaningful and effective
participation by all interested individuals. This included, at least in the IETF’s early days, a
significant proportion of academic and government representatives. Competing attempts at
developing standards for network connectivity were largely driven by corporate interests, e.g. the
telecommunications network operators prominently represented in the Consultative Committee for
International Telegraph and Telephone (CCITT).97 CCITT worked within ISO to create the Open
Systems Interconnection model (OSI). Backed by numerous governments (including the U.S.,
which at one point referenced its own OSI implementation, GOSIP, for public procurement),98
OSI was a plausible contender to become the world standard for computer connectivity. OSI
however was undermined by conflicts among different stakeholder constituencies (such as the
“legacy” providers of proprietary network solutions, most notably IBM, and telecommunications
network operators), which created significant challenges for the traditional, open and consensusoriented decision making processes. As historian Andrew Russell notes.
Whereas OSI found the time-honored principles of democratic inclusivity to be both
necessary and fatal, the Internet flourished by developing their network architecture within
a well-funded and homogeneous environment that was, in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
insulated from commercial and political pressures.99
93

Martin Weiss & Carl Cargill, Consortia in the standards development process, 43 J. AM. SOCY. INFO. SCI. 559
(1992); YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 255-56 (“in the late 1980s large information technology companies in
the United States and elsewhere turned away from multi-stakeholder consensus-based standard-setting organizations
and toward each other to address their standardization needs”).
94
Weiss & Cargill, supra note 93, at 563.
95
Id. As they grew in significance, some consortia gravitated closer to the established SDOs, and partly embraced
their procedural principles. For instance, the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards
(OASIS), a software-based consortium, sought and obtained ANSI accreditation.
96
See, generally, YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 242-54.
97
RUSSELL, supra note 19, at 179 (“The CCITT’s protocols were deliberately designed to put control of the network
in the hands of the PTTs”).
98
Andrew Russell. 'Rough consensus and running code' and the Internet-OSI standards war. IEEE ANNALS OF THE
HISTORY OF COMPUTING 28.3 (2006), at 53.
99
RUSSELL, supra note 19, at 258.
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Consortia and the early IETF constituted formidable competitors to more formal SDOs,
because they offered an unbureaucratic venue for homogeneous groups to make rapid progress on
the development of technically viable standards. IETF’s seemingly “autocratic” governance
structure (decisions were largely made by a centralized group of engineers) came under increasing
criticism by its diverse participants, culminating in 1992 in a “constitutional crisis”, which initiated
a new institutional model based more heavily on principles of openness (see below). 100
Nevertheless, by that time, the Internet had already emerged victorious over its rival OSI, with
IETF as its primary venue for standards development.
These consortia models thus competed with traditional SDOs, which had to become more
flexible in order to remain viable. At the same time, closed standardization processes were at odds
with the societal concerns that had led to the formalization of due process principles for
standardization in the 1970s. Even though the explicit reference to these due process principles
was eliminated from OMB Circular in 1982, the early IETF and the numerous consortia emerging
in the 1980s seemingly fell outside the Circular’s definition of “voluntary standards body”. In
practice, while federal regulations incorporate standards issued by a large number of nongovernmental organizations, including some consortia, these standards still predominantly
originate from ANSI-accredited ASDs, formal international SDOs, and other well-established
organizations.
H.

THE IMPACT OF ANTITRUST LAW ON BALANCE REQUIREMENTS: HYDROLEVEL AND ALLIED
TUBE (1980S)

Industrial collusion in the context of standard setting has been observed for many years. For
example, in 1962, the Department of Justice secured criminal indictments against the JohnsManville Corporation and several of its employees for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act for
bringing about the adoption by ASTM and another SDO “specifications designed to increase the
costs of foreign-made asbestos-cement pipe and couplings, to render such products ineligible for
use, and to otherwise restrict and eliminate competition from such foreign-made products.”101 Yet
ASTM itself was exonerated from the charges and the judge later spoke glowingly of “the balance
of interests represented on ASTM committees and … the detailed and scrupulously observed
procedure which governs their operation”.102
But by the 1980s, the procedures and processes of SDOs themselves began to come under
judicial scrutiny when coupled with allegedly anticompetitive behavior by SDO participants. Two
of the most important cases of this type were American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
v. Hydrolevel,103 and Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.104 Each case involved

100

Id. at 256.
Application of American Soc. for Testing & Materials, 231 F. Supp. 686, 687 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
102
Spivak & Brenner, supra note 4, at 38 (quoting unreported judicial findings of fact).
103
456 U.S. 556 (1982).
104
486 U.S. 492 (1988).
101
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antitrust claims that challenged the procedures used within SDOs and helped to shape the modern
understanding of “due process” requirements within the standardization context.105
ASME involved a standard for boilers and pressure vessels promulgated by a committee of
ASME, an ANSI-accredited SDO. Hydrolevel marketed a boiler safety device that competed with
devices marketed by the industry leader, McDonnell & Miller, Inc. (M&M). In response to the
loss of a large customer to Hydrolevel, two employee of M&M affiliated companies, who also
served as the chair and vice-chair of the relevant ASME subcommittee, issued a statement on
ASME letterhead that the type of device manufactured by Hydrolevel provided “no positive
assurance” that ASME’s safety standards would be met. M&M employees then distributed this
letter to potential customers, implying that Hydrolevel’s device was unsafe and causing Hydrolevel
to lose significant business. When Hydrolevel discovered that M&M was behind the ASME letter,
it sued M&M and ASME for violating Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which prohibits
conspiracies in restraint of trade.
Hydrolevel settled its claims against M&M, but ASME refused to settle, taking the position
that it should not be held responsible for the anticompetitive conduct of its participants. The
Supreme Court decided the case in 1982, holding not only that ASME was liable for the conduct
of the M&M employees acting in their capacities as ASME officers, but affirming an award of
treble damages against the SDO. The ASME decision established that SDOs can be liable for
antitrust violations committed by their participants, and underscored the need for SDOs to adopt
processes that mitigate the potential for anticompetitive outcomes.106
The implications of this principle for SDO balance requirements were subsequently clarified
in the Supreme Court’s Allied Tube decision. The SDO in question was the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA), a large organization formed in 1896 to develop standards for fire
safety equipment and systems. At the time, NFPA had approximately 30,000 members drawn from
state and local governments, educational institutions, professional associations, manufacturers and
users of fire-fighting equipment, and fire insurance companies.107 In addition to fire codes, NFPA
is also responsible for the National Electrical Code, which establishes requirements for the design
and installation of electrical wiring systems, many of which are adopted into local building codes
and regulations.108 The facts of the controversy that ensued at NFPA, which are reproduced in
detail below for illustrative purposes, are as follows:109

105

Legal regimes, and antitrust law in particular, have strongly shaped SDO practices and procedures. See JRC
Report, supra note 2, at x.
106
ASME, 456 U.S. at 573 (“Only ASME can take systematic steps to make improper conduct on the part of all its
agents unlikely, and the possibility of civil liability will inevitably be a powerful incentive for ASME to take those
steps. Thus, a rule that imposes liability on the standard-setting organization – which is best situated to prevent
antitrust violations through the abuse of its reputation – is most faithful to the congressional intent that the private
right of action deter antitrust violations.”).
107
Hamilton, Role, supra note 26, at 1340 (“Manufacturers constitute about six and one-half percent and insurance
companies eleven percent of NFPA's membership”).
108
Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 495-96.
109
The facts underlying the famous Allied Tube case are but one of several controversies involving NFPA and its
procedures during the 1980s. See FTC 1983 Report, supra note 82, at 162-63 (citing additional complaints that
NFPA’s “procedural rules governing standards development were exploited to thwart participation”).
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Among the electrical products covered by the Code is electrical conduit, the hollow tubing
used as a raceway to carry electrical wires through the walls and floors of buildings.
Throughout the relevant period, the Code permitted using electrical conduit made of steel,
and almost all conduit sold was in fact steel conduit. Starting in 1980, [Indian Head, Inc.
(IHI)] began to offer plastic conduit made of polyvinyl chloride…
[IHI] initiated a proposal to include polyvinyl chloride conduit as an approved type of
electrical conduit in the 1981 edition of the Code. Following approval by one of the
Association's professional panels, this proposal was scheduled for consideration at the 1980
annual meeting, where it could be adopted or rejected by a simple majority of the members
present. Alarmed that, if approved, [IHI’s] product might pose a competitive threat to steel
conduit, [Allied Tube], the Nation's largest producer of steel conduit, met to plan strategy
with, among others, members of the steel industry, other steel conduit manufacturers, and
its independent sales agents. They collectively agreed to exclude [IHI’s] product from the
1981 Code by packing the upcoming annual meeting with new Association members
whose only function would be to vote against the polyvinyl chloride proposal.
Combined, the steel interests recruited 230 persons to join the Association and to attend
the annual meeting to vote against the proposal. [Allied Tube] alone recruited 155 persons
-- including employees, executives, sales agents, the agents' employees, employees from
two divisions that did not sell electrical products, and the wife of a national sales director.
[Allied Tube] and the other steel interests also paid over $100,000 for the membership,
registration, and attendance expenses of these voters. At the annual meeting, the steel group
voters were instructed where to sit and how and when to vote by group leaders who used
walkie-talkies and hand signals to facilitate communication. Few of the steel group voters
had any of the technical documentation necessary to follow the meeting. None of them
spoke at the meeting to give their reasons for opposing the proposal to approve polyvinyl
chloride conduit. Nonetheless, with their solid vote in opposition, the proposal was rejected
and returned to committee by a vote of 394 to 390.110

Shortly after this vote, IHI brought suit against Allied Tube and other steel conduit
manufacturers alleging that they had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by unreasonably
restraining trade in the electrical conduit market. After a jury trial, a verdict was entered against
Allied Tube and its co-defendants.111 But the verdict was nullified by the district court n.o.v. under
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 112 and it was this issue that was eventually appealed to the
Supreme Court in 1988 (IHI won on this point as well – the jury verdict against Allied Tube was
reinstated).113

110

Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 496-97.
Id. at 498.
112
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U. S. 127 (1961); United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657 (1965). The so-called Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides that “where a
restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to private action, those
urging the governmental action enjoy absolute immunity from antitrust liability for the anticompetitive restraint.”
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136.
113
Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 509-10 (“we hold that, at least where, as here, an economically interested party exercises
decisionmaking authority in formulating a product standard for a private association that comprises market
111
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But it is not the Noerr issue for which the Allied Tube case is remembered today. Rather, it is
the Court’s dicta approving the jury’s finding of antitrust liability against Allied Tube and the other
steel conduit manufacturers. Specifically, the Court recognizes that the “hope of procompetitive
benefits [from standard-setting] depends upon the existence of safeguards sufficient to prevent the
standard-setting process from being biased by members with economic interests in restraining
competition.” 114 It goes on to observe that “[w]hat [SDO members] may not do (without exposing
itself to possible antitrust liability for direct injuries) is bias the [standard-setting] process by, as
in this case, stacking the private standard-setting body with decisionmakers sharing their economic
interest in restraining competition.” 115 Thus, the Court recognized that an SDO member’s attempt
to stack the deck to defeat a particular proposal or to gain some other economic advantage in
standard-setting could be enough to result in a violation of the Sherman Act. Accordingly, the
Court conceptualized its vision of a properly-functioning standardization system as one that is
“nonpartisan”.116
I.

1990S – 2000S: THE NTTAA, THE 1998 REVISIONS TO OMB CIRCULAR A-119, AND
ANSI’S ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS

In 1992, four years after the Allied Tube decision, OMB issued a new request for comments
regarding Circular A-119. In response, several commenters suggested that the definitions in
Circular A-119 were “ambiguous” and recommended changing them to reflect either the Supreme
Court’s approach in Allied Tube or the definitions in the GATT Standards Code. OMB declined
to change the definitions in the Circular, noting that they “are not being misinterpreted and have
served their purpose well”.117 A final revised version of the Circular was issued on October 26,
1993. It did not require that SDOs adopt specific balancing of interests or other due process
principles.118
In 1996, President Clinton signed the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
(NTTAA).119 Among other things, the NTTAA embodied in statutory language the OMB Circular
A-119 requirement that federal agencies “use technical standards that are developed or adopted by
voluntary consensus standards bodies.”120 Because the term “voluntary consensus standards body”
was not expressly defined in the NTTAA, it was generally understood to refer to the definition
contained in the Circular.
The enactment of the NTTAA thus led to another review of the Circular, and on December 27,
1996, OMB released a new draft version for public comment.121 Public hearings were held on
participants, that party enjoys no Noerr immunity from any antitrust liability flowing from the effect the standard
has of its own force in the marketplace.”)
114
Id. at 509.
115
Id. at 511.
116
Id. at 506-07.
117
58 Fed. Reg. 57,643 (1993).
118
Id.
119
Pub. Law 104-113 (1996).
120
Id. at § 12(d)(1).
121
61 Fed. Reg. 68,312 (1996)
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February 10, 1997 and comments were received from over 50 sources. OMB published the final
revisions to the Circular on February 19, 1998.122
The 1998 revisions of the Circular constitute a complete overhaul of the structure and language
of the Circular, converting it to a “plain English” question-and-answer format. It substantially
altered the definition of “voluntary consensus standards body” from prior versions of the Circular.
The new definition reads as follows:
A voluntary consensus standards body is defined by the following attributes:
(i)
Openness.
(ii)
Balance of interest.
(iii)
Due process.
(iv)
An appeals process.
(v)
Consensus, which is defined as general agreement, but not necessarily unanimity,
and includes a process for attempting to resolve objections by interested parties …”123

This definition differs significantly from the definition of “voluntary standards body”
contained in each prior version of Circular A-119. Whereas earlier definitions simply referred to
organizations that “develop, establish, or coordinate voluntary standards”, the 1998 definition
imposes a new set of criteria defining such bodies, including openness, balance of interest, and
due process. It is possible that the Supreme Court’s decision in Allied Tube influenced OMB in
developing this new set of criteria for SDOs, particularly a formal requirement of “balance” (which
would conceivably prevent the type of deck-stacking attempted by Allied and its co-conspirators).
But other than “consensus” none of the new terms (including “balance of interest”) was defined in
the 1998 version of the Circular.124
J.

THE STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION ADVANCEMENT ACT OF 2004

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the standardization world witnessed a wave of litigation
involving allegations of deception involving patents by companies including, most notably,
Rambus, Inc.125 Among other things, Rambus was the subject of an investigation and prosecution
by the FTC, which accused it of violating both the Sherman Act and the FTC Act. These antitrust
actions caused SDOs around the world to revisit their intellectual property policies and to consider
their potential liability in such disputes.126 One of the outgrowths of this heightened awareness
was the enactment in 2004 of the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act

122

63 Fed. Reg. 8,546 (1998).
63 Fed. Reg. 8,554, § 4.a(1).
124
Several commenters in 1997 requested that OMB clarify these definitions, but OMB declined to do so. 63 Fed.
Reg. 8,548, Item 28.
125
See, generally, Renata B. Hesse & Frances Marshall, U.S. Antitrust Aspects of FRAND Disputes in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS 263,
272-74 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018).
126
See JRC Report, supra note 2, at 140.
123
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(SDOAA), 127 which was intended to offer SDOs protection against certain types of antitrust
liability that could arise from the actions of their members.
Rather than craft a new legislative framework for this protection, Congress simply added SDOs
to the types of entities already protected under the existing National Cooperative Research and
Production Act of 1993 (NCRPA),128 which itself was an outgrowth of the Reagan-era National
Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (NCRA). 129 When enacted the NCRA was intended to
encourage innovation and promote trade by facilitating the participation of U.S. industries in R&D
joint ventures.130 To achieve this goal, the NCRA offered two principal antitrust protections to
qualifying “joint research and development ventures” – an immunity from treble damages under
the antitrust laws131 and a requirement that the conduct of joint R&D by such entities be evaluated
under the antitrust “rule of reason” and not be subject to per se liability.132 In 1993, given pressures
on U.S. manufacturing industries, the protections of the NCRA were extended to joint production
ventures.133
Under the original NCRA, “joint research and development ventures” are defined as “two or
more persons” engaged in one of a variety of enumerated technical cooperation activities, and
which did not engage in any of a list of prohibited anticompetitive activities.134 This definitional
structure was preserved in the NCRPA. 135 Under the SDOAA, “standards development
organizations” were added to the types of entities protected by the Act. It defines “standards
development organization” as “a domestic or international organization that plans, develops,
establishes, or coordinates voluntary consensus standards using procedures that incorporate the
attributes of openness, balance of interests, due process, an appeals process, and consensus in a
manner consistent with the Office of Management and Budget Circular Number A–119, as revised
February 10, 1998.” 136 Like the 1998 circular, the SDO balance requirement under the SDOAA is
not defined.
However, the preamble to the SDOAA elaborates on the due process requirements of OMB
Circular A-119, noting in particular that the “balance” requirement provides for “balancing
interests so that standards development activities are not dominated by any single group of
interested persons.” 137 This “non-domination” balance requirement, which must be read into the
text of the SDOAA, is distinctly not a quota requirement. That is, the SDOAA does not mandate
127

Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, Public Law 108–237 (2004), codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 4301-4306.
128
National Cooperative Production Amendments of 1993, Public Law 103–42 (Jun. 10, 1993), codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 4301 et seq.
129
Public Law 98-462 (Oct. 11, 1984), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301 et seq.
130
Id.
131
Id. § 4.
132
Id. § 3.
133
NCRPA, supra note 128.
134
NCRA, supra note 129, § 2(6).
135
NCRPA, supra note 128.
136
Id. § 103(1)(8). Interestingly, the SDOAA (both at the time of its enactment and today) expressly incorporates
the 1998 version of OMB Circular A-119 into its definition of “standards development organization”. Thus, it is not
clear that definitions from subsequent versions of the Circular (e.g., the 2016 version, discussed below) are actually
incorporated into the SDOAA.
137
Id. § 102(5)(C).
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that SDOs ensure that all or every conceivable interest group be represented in SDO decision
making, but only that SDO deliberations are not “dominated” by any single group. This nondomination requirement echoes the cautionary language of the Supreme Court in Allied Tube,
which warned against “stacking the private standard-setting body with decisionmakers sharing
their economic interest in restraining competition.”138
K.

BALANCE AND THE ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS

ANSI’s Procedures document was superseded in 2003 by a new document titled Due Process
Requirements for American National Standards, better known as the ANSI Essential
Requirements. At a high level, the ANSI Essential Requirements echo the “due process”
requirements of OMB Circular A-119. Thus, they provide that a developer of American National
Standards must operate according to principles of openness, lack of dominance, balance, consensus
and appeals.139 In terms of balance, however, ANSI adopted a semi-structured approach falling
somewhere between the rigid quota requirements of ASTM and the unstructured requirements of
Circular A-119 and the SDOAA.
Section 1.3 of the Essential Requirements, which establishes at the outset that “The standards
development process should have a balance of interests”, imposes the following affirmative
requirements on accredited SDOs:
Participants from diverse interest categories shall be sought with the objective of achieving
balance. If a consensus body lacks balance in accordance with the historical criteria for
balance, and no specific alternative formulation of balance was approved by the ANSI
Executive Standards Council, outreach to achieve balance shall be undertaken.140

The “historical criteria” referred to above are set out in Section 2.3 which provides:
Historically the criteria for balance are that a) no single interest category constitutes more
than one-third of the membership of a consensus body dealing with safety-related standards
or b) no single interest category constitutes a majority of the membership of a consensus
body dealing with other than safety-related standards.

In defining an “interest category”, ANSI notes that such categories may vary from case to case,
being “a function of the nature of the standards being developed”. Though not strictly required,
three interest categories are suggested: producer, user141 and general interest. However, the door
is left open “where appropriate” for the consideration of additional interest categories including
consumer, directly affected public, distributor and retailer, industrial/commercial, insurance, labor,
manufacturer, professional society, regulatory agency, testing laboratory, and trade association.142
138

Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 511.
Am. Natl. Standards Inst., ANSI Essential Requirements: Due Process Requirements for American National
Standards 4 (2019) [hereinafter ANSI Essential Requirements (2019)].
140
Id.
141
Four different sub-categories of “user” are defined based on the type of standard being produced: consumer,
industrial, government and labor. Id.
142
ANSI’s non-exhaustive list of potential interest categories does not include firms seeking to monetize patents or
foreign manufacturers.
139
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The ANSI Essential Requirements impose an affirmative duty on accredited SDOs to seek
participants from diverse interest categories, and that if balance does not exist, the SDO must
undertake outreach to achieve that balance. As the ANSI Executive Standards Council clarified in
2016, “outreach to achieve balance in accordance with a developer’s accredited procedures is a
requirement.” 143 Such outreach must be targeted to any “specific interest categories is not
sufficiently populated on an [SDO] consensus body”, and may include: “specific website
solicitations, webinars, meeting announcements with specific recruitment of identified interest
categories sought, social media postings, targeted solicitations in meeting agendas and reports,
trade press, publications, direct E-mails/mailings, press releases, articles, phone calls (document
them) and soliciting recommendations from consensus body members.”144
In addition to these outreach requirements, the ANSI Essential Requirements include a separate
non-domination requirement:
The standards development process shall not be dominated by any single interest category,
individual or organization. Dominance means a position or exercise of dominant authority,
leadership, or influence by reason of superior leverage, strength, or representation to the
exclusion of fair and equitable consideration of other viewpoints.145

ANSI clearly considers balance and lack of dominance to be distinct considerations.146 As its
Executive Standards Council explains:
The existence of a balanced consensus body does not preclude the exercise of dominance.
Similarly, the existence of a less than perfectly balanced consensus body does not
necessarily reflect a process in which dominance automatically occurs. 147

Accordingly, ANSI requires both affirmative outreach activity to ensure balance, and a final
group composition that avoids dominance by any single interest category.
L.

THE 2016 REVISION OF OMB CIRCULAR A-119 AND BEYOND

In 2012, OMB again invited public commentary on Circular A-119.148 After releasing a draft
revision in 2014, OMB published the final revised version of Circular A-119 in January 2016.149
It includes the following provision:
143

ANSI, Guidance on “Balance” and Outreach within the American National Standards (ANS) Process (ExSC
042_2016) at ¶ 3.0 [hereinafter ANSI Balance Guidance]. When assessing whether an SDO has complied with this
requirement, ANSI “may request related evidence that demonstrates the type of outreach undertaken by a developer
to achieve balance”.
144
Id. ¶ 4.
145
ANSI Essential Requirements (2019), supra note 139, at § 1.2.
146
ANSI Balance Guidance, supra note 143, ¶ 6.
147
Id.
148
77 Fed. Reg. 19,357 (2012).
149
81 Fed. Reg. 4,673 (2016), referencing Office of Management and Budget, OMB Circular A-119: Federal
Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment
Activities, Jan. 22, 2016 [OMB Circular A-119 (2016)].
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Balance: The standards development process should be balanced. Specifically, there should
be meaningful involvement from a broad range of parties, with no single interest
dominating the decision-making.150

The 2016 version of the Circular encourages “meaningful involvement” not from all affected
stakeholder groups, but from “a broad range” of parties. This requirement avoids formal quota
language, as it does not specify that SDO decision making bodies should be composed of particular
proportions of different stakeholder groups. Rather, the balance to be attained appears more
flexible. In its responses to comments on the definition of balance, the OMB stated that it intended
its definition of balance to be “consistent” with ANSI’s Essential Requirements, and to “allow for
flexibility in how balance is determined during the consensus phase of the development or
adoption of the standard.”151
In addition, the Circular echoes the “non-domination” language of the 2004 SDOAA. It
prohibits any “single interest from dominating the decision-making.” This being said, the 2016
version of the Circular introduces a new element to the balance calculation: the differing interests
of holders of intellectual property rights (IPR) and implementers of a standard. While this
distinction is not mentioned in the section of the Circular that discusses balance, it appears in the
immediately preceding paragraph, which defines “voluntary consensus standard”:
In order to qualify as a “voluntary consensus standard” for the purposes of this Circular, a
standard that includes patented technology needs to be governed by such policies, which
should be easily accessible, set out clear rules governing the disclosure and licensing of the
relevant intellectual property, and take into account the interests of all stakeholders,
including the IPR holders and those seeking to implement the standard.152

The inclusion of IPR holders in this seeming invocation of balance principles would become
important in the years immediately following the publication of the 2016 Circular, as discussed in
Part N, below.
M.

PRACTICAL BALANCE

One model of standards development that emerged from the computing industry in the 1980s
eschews any formal requirement to balance stakeholder interests, and instead relies on the
openness of the standardization process to ensure that all interested parties have an opportunity to
participate.153 This emphasis on openness is coupled with monitoring and informal intervention
by the group’s leadership “to ensure that no one group holds an overwhelming edge that might
influence adversely the fairness of the standards produced.”154
150
151

OMB Circular A-119 (2016), supra note 149, at § 2(e)(ii).
OMB Circular A-119 (2016), Supplementary Material, Discussion and Responses to Significant Comments, at

7.

152

OMB Circular A-119 (2016), supra note 149, at § 2(d).
See CARL F. CARGILL, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY STANDARDIZATION : THEORY, PROCESS, AND
ORGANIZATIONS 99, 109 (1989) (“working groups … are composed of volunteers representing all facets of the
affected industry – the providers, the users, government, academia, interested or involved groups, and individual
experts”).
154
CARGILL, supra note 153, at 108.
153
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Despite the potential benefit of qualifying as a “voluntary consensus standards body” under
OMB Circular A-119 and the SDOAA, and as a developer of American National Standards, some
SDOs in this camp have steadfastly refused to adopt any formal balance requirements in their rules
and policies. The most notable of these holdouts is the IETF, 155 which in 1992 moved to a
governance model emphasizing its openness to all interested parties,156 but which does not impose
any formal requirements of balance on its deliberations. 157 The IETF explained in its 2012
comments to OMB its belief that a balance requirement “is largely duplicative of the "openness"
and "due process" prongs of the definition [of voluntary consensus standards body]”.158 It further
noted that IETF is widely acknowledged by both federal agencies and academic commentators to
be an exceptionally open and democratic body.159 As such, IETF contends that it achieves a high
degree of balance through the mechanism of openness – what may be termed “practical balance”.
This approach, while not achieving the degree of numerical balancing that could be achieved under
a quota or more formal balancing system, has resulted in a long-standing and effective
standardization process. Moreover, this approach does appear to enable the participation of diverse
interest groups in IETF standardization projects when potential standardization activity impacts
issues of public concern, such as privacy and government surveillance.160
IETF has reinforced its interpretation of “balance” in the stated principles of the OpenStand
initiative, which also includes the IEEE Standards Association and W3C. There, “Balance” is
included as one of the five principles shaping the “modern paradigm for standards” and is defined
for this purpose as having standards activities that “are not exclusively dominated by any particular
person, company or interest group.” 161 As such, the IETF (and IEEE-SA and W3C) seem to
embrace a “non-domination” interpretation of balance, rather than a more prescriptive formula for
including certain interest groups.
Moreover, even without formal balance requirements, some SDOs have taken positive steps to
encourage participation by diverse stakeholder groups including consumers and civil society.162

155

IETF has, by choice, never sought accreditation by ANSI.
See Letter dated Apr. 29, 2012 from Jorge L. Contreras, Russ Housley and Bernard Aboba to Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, at 2 [hereinafter IETF Letter] (“The IETF
is completely open to newcomers, and has no membership fee or other membership requirements.”) See also YATES
& MURPHY, supra note 1, at 253-54
157
See YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 253-54. There are some exceptions to this general principle at IETF. One
exception regards the composition of Nominating Committees (NomComs), whose ten members are randomly
selected from a pool of qualifying volunteers. If the random selection results in more than two appointees with the
same affiliation being selected, the third such candidate is replaced with another candidate randomly selected from
the pool.
158
IETF Letter, supra note 156, at 4.
159
Id.
160
See ALISON HARCOURT, GEORGE CHRISTOU, SEAMUS SIMPSON, GLOBAL STANDARD SETTING IN INTERNET
GOVERNANCE 160-61 (2020) (integration of consumer interest groups into IETF discussion of government
surveillance of Internet traffic) and 182-83 (involvement of Center for Democracy and Technology and other citizen
groups in IETF data privacy discussions); John B. Morris, Jr., Injecting the Public Interest into Internet Standards
in OPENING STANDARDS: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTEROPERABILITY 3, 9-10 (Laura DeNardis, ed., 2011)
(discussing examples of engagement by public interest/policy advocates in IETF standard setting).
161
OpenStand, Principles, https://open-stand.org/about-us/principles/ (visited Sep. 17, 2020).
162
See JRC Report, supra note 2, at 120.
156
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IETF, through its parent organization the Internet Society, regularly funds the participation in IETF
standardization activities of individuals from developing countries.163

N.

BALANCE IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICIES

In 2015, IEEE amended its patent policy 164 in a manner that was argued by some to be
unfavorable to IEEE participants that primarily sought to earn revenue from the licensing of
patents covering IEEE standards (“patent-centric” firms) and overly favorable to participants that
primarily sought to earn revenue from sales of standardized products (“product-centric” firms).165
As such, both the IEEE policy and the decision making process that led to its adoption, were
criticized as being unbalanced. The ensuing public debate over the IEEE policy involved multiple
SDO participants, SDOs and the U.S. DOJ.
On February 2, 2015, the DOJ issued a Business Review Letter, which recognizes that an
unbalanced process for setting an IPR Policy may potentially violate antitrust laws. 166
Nevertheless, after reviewing the process through which the update was adopted, the letter
concludes that “Given the numerous opportunities for comment, discussion, and voting at different
levels within IEEE, the Department cannot conclude that the process raises antitrust concerns”.167
To reach this conclusion, the DOJ relied on the ability of all stakeholders to make comments,
approval of the policy by majorities and supermajorities in different governance bodies, and the
“fiduciary” duty of members of these bodies towards the IEEE; but did not further discuss patentcentric firms’ concerns with the composition of these governance bodies.
Under the Trump Administration, DOJ officials gave numerous speeches emphasizing a more
stringent interpretation of balance requirements for SDOs under antitrust laws, in particular with
respect to the balance between the interests of patent- and product-centric firms.168 In 2018, the
DOJ, in reviewing a proposed ANSI policy change regarding the review of letters of assurance
from accredited SDOs, reminded ANSI that “the Antitrust Division will ... be skeptical of rules
that SSOs impose that appear designed specifically to shift bargaining leverage from IP creators
163

See Jorge L. Contreras, National Disparities and Standards-Essential Patents: Considerations for India in
COMPLICATIONS AND QUANDARIES IN THE ICT SECTOR: STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS AND COMPETITION ISSUES
(Ashish Bharadwaj, Vishwas H. Deviah & Indranath Gupta, eds., Springer: 2017). Since 2012, there has also been
an increased focus within IETF on representation of women in leadership positions. Nevertheless, diversity among
individual SDO participants along demographic lines needs to be distinguished from balanced representation of
different stakeholder interest categories.
164
For a discussion of these amendments, see JRC Report, supra note 2, at 151-64.
165
E.g. J. Gregory Sidak, Testing for Bias to Suppress Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 1 CRITERION J. ON
INNOVATION 301 (2016); Nicolo Zingales & Olia Kanevskaia, The IEEE-SA patent policy update under the lens of
EU competition law, 12 EUR. COMPETITION J.195 (2016). For the distinction between patent- and product-centric
firms, see Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical
Study, 53 JURIMETRICS J. 163, 206-07 (2013) (introducing terminology).
166
“If a standards-setting process is biased in favor of one set of interests, there is a danger of anticompetitive effects
and antitrust liability.” Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen. U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Michael
A. Lindsay, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney LLP (Feb. 2, 2015).
167
Id.
168
See e.g. speeches by Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim on November 10, 2017
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1010746/download
and
March
16,
2018
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1044316/download.
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to implementers, or vice versa.” 169 The DOJ then called upon ANSI to “promote balanced
representation in decisional bodies so that diverse interests are represented and SDO decisions do
not shift bargaining leverage in favor of one set of economic interests, including the interests of
either implementers or patent holders.”170 The DOJ again reminded ANSI of the importance of
balance in a 2020 review of the 2015 U.S. Standards Strategy published by ANSI, writing that
principles of openness and balance of interests should extend to intellectual property policy
development. If an SSO’s intellectual property rights policy is too restrictive for one side
or the other, it also risks deterring participation in procompetitive standard setting. The
Department has urged ANSI to have balanced representation in its decisional bodies that
are charged with implementing and revising ANSI’s Patent Policy, so that diverse interests
are represented, and so that their decisions do not shift bargaining leverage in favor of one
set of economic interests, including the interests of either implementers or patent holders.171

In 2019, the DOJ expressed “significant concerns” that the GSM Association and its operator
members “used an unbalanced standard-setting process, with procedures that stacked the deck in
their favor, to promulgate [a standard] with self-dealing provisions designed to enhance or
maintain the incumbent operators’ competitive position by entrenching network locking practices
and otherwise deterring potentially disruptive competition.”172
In 2020, the DOJ updated its 2015 business review letter to IEEE,173 citing both the IPR-related
language of the 2016 version of OMB Circular A-119 as well as concerns raised in 2015 “that the
IEEE's process for adopting the Policy was not balanced.”174 The DOJ emphasized that “[b]alance
is … important not only to encourage participation and competition among patent holders in the
standard-setting process, but also to ensure more significant antitrust concerns do not arise.” 175 It
concluded by encouraging IEEE to consider whether further changes to its IPR policy might be
warranted in order to address “the need for an open, balanced, and transparent process for standards
development.”176
The repeated emphasis by the DOJ on the need to take into account the interests of both patentand product-centric firms when making SDO policy decisions on IPR indicates that IPR-related
concerns were the primary focus of the Trump Administration’s interest in SDOs balance
requirements. The implications of this shift are discussed in greater detail in Part V, below.

169

Letter from Andrew Finch, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y General, Antitrust Div. to Patricia Griffin, Vice
President and General Counsel, Am. Nat'l Standards Inst. at 1 (Mar. 7, 2018) [DOJ ANSI Letter].
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Letter from Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General to Sophia A. Muirhead at 10 n.53 (Sep. 10, 2020)
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BALANCE REQUIREMENTS IN EUROPEAN STANDARDIZATION POLICY
AND PRACTICE
A.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS

As in the U.S., standardization in Europe has its origins in the standardization “movement” of
the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Most early European standardization bodies arose from
engineering associations. Electrical engineers, in particular, formed national associations in the
leading European countries at the end of the 19th century. 177 These associations ventured into
standardization in the early 20th century. The British Standards Institute (BSI) was founded in
1901, making it the oldest National Standards Body (NSB) in the world.178 In Germany, the
Normenausschuß der deutschen Industrie (NADI, "Standardization Committee of German
Industry") was created in 1917 in the context of World War I and the mobilization of German
industry in support of the war effort.179 This is the precursor organization to today’s Deutsches
Institut für Normung, or 'DIN', the German NSB. Other European NSBs or their precursor
organizations were created early in the 20th Century, such as the French Association française de
normalisation, or ‘AFNOR’, in 1926.180
The activities of the European NSBs are also firmly rooted in the development of international
standards. In fact, AFNOR was specifically created in 1926 in the context of the creation of the
International Federation of the National Standardizing Associations (ISA) in order to allow for
French representation in this international standardization organization. The founder of BSI,
Charles Le Maistre, “has some claim to be known as the father of international standardization”,181
and was prominently involved in the formation and leadership of both ISA and the IEC. Given the
prominent role of international standards for the European NSBs, it is not surprising that the
European NSBs were built on similar procedural principles as the international organizations and
as their counterparts in the U.S.
The importance of a balance of interests in representation in standards development, one of the
most prominent standardization principles at the international standards organizations of the time,
was similarly recognized by the early European NSBs and their individual leadership. 182 There
were however limited formal requirements imposed on private standards development. BSI was
first offered a Royal Charter in 1929, but this document does not stipulate specific standardization
processes or principles. In Germany and other European countries, there was no formal
177

YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 27-28.
Id. at 52.
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GÜNTHER LUXBACHER. DIN VON 1917 BIS 2019 – NORMUNG ZWISCHEN KONSENS UND KONKURRENZ IM
INTERESSE DER TECHNISCH-WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN ENTWICKLUNG 48-61 (2020).
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YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 86.
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JACK LATIMER, FRIENDSHIP AMONG EQUALS: RECOLLECTIONS FROM ISO’S FIRST FIFTY YEARS 16 (1997).
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YATES & MURPHY, supra note 1, at 79, indicate that the main mover behind the creation of DIN, Waldermar
Hellmich, believed very strongly in the need to involve all stakeholder (Interessengruppen) in standardization
proceedings, in order to ensure both the quality and the legitimacy of the resulting standard.
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governmental standardization policy at the time. Nevertheless, NSBs such as Germany’s DIN
already saw a need to strengthen the legitimacy of their norms, and formulated general
standardization principles. The preamble of DIN’s 1928 ‘standardization principles’ formulated a
general balance requirement: “Standards must not be imposed from above, but have to be the result
of collaborative efforts and agreement of all participants among producers, merchants, consumers,
public authorities and science”183.

B.

NATIONAL STANDARDS BODIES: GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION AND FORMAL
STANDARDIZATION PRINCIPLES

During the 1960s and 1970s, private standards development in Europe was increasingly
criticized as overly responsive to industry interests at the expense of other societal groups and
concerns.184 At the same time, technology standards became increasingly important not only for
industry, but also for regulation. In this context, in many countries in Europe governments
perceived the need for a more formal standardization policy. This standardization policy generally
entailed a formal government recognition of a private sector NSB as the country’s primary
developer of national standards and representative in international standardization. In return, these
policies stipulated standardization process principles – with different degrees of stringency and
specificity – that aimed at ensuring better representation of dispersed and traditionally underrepresented societal interests (most notably consumers, but also labor, government, science, and –
later – environmental groups).
There were two options for the form of this standardization policy. Countries such as Austria,
Belgium, and France chose legislation, whereas Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the UK instead
opted for an agreement between the government and the NSB.
The Staatsvertrag, the 1975 treaty setting out the agreement between DIN and the German
government exemplifies a flexible approach to standardization policy. 185 The explanations
accompanying the treaty recognize that standardization is a form of industry self-regulation (thus
implicitly recognizing not only the absence of rigid government oversight of standardization
practices, but also the dominant role of industry in standards development).186 The treaty offers
financial support for standards development and formal recognition of DIN as German NSB, but
excludes any delegation of governmental authority to DIN. In exchange for this recognition, DIN
commits to pursue the public interest in standards development. The explanations appended to the
treaty state that the pursuit of the public interest encompasses the development of standards
183

“Normen dürfen nicht am grünen Tisch entstehen, sondern müssen aus gemeinschaftlicher Arbeit und
Übereinkunft aller Beteiligten der Erzeuger, Händler und Verbraucher der Behörden und der Wissenschaft
hervorgehen.” LUXBACHER. supra note 179, at 88. Luxbacher highlights that at that time, similar to the English
“consumer”, the German word “Verbraucher” did not designate individual end users, but industrial and commercial
users of industrial goods, such as the railways. Id. at 84.
184
See e.g. re. Germany LUXBACHER. supra note 179, at 353-55.
185
Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, vertreten durch den Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, und dem
DIN Deutsches Institut für Normung e. V., vertreten durch dessen Präsidenten, 1975.
186
Erläuterungen zum Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem DIN Deutsches Institut für
Normung e. V., 1975.
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relevant to environmental protection, health and safety, and consumer protection.187 In terms of
representation, DIN is held to pursue the public interest by involving the relevant government
authorities in its standardization processes.
The treaty makes no mention of a balance of interests between different constituencies or
private stakeholder groups within DIN. It does however commit DIN to abide by the
standardization principles defined in DIN Standard 820-1 (Grundsätze der Normungsarbeit),
which describes high-level principles of standards development, (version of 1974), and requires
DIN to respect the stipulations of the treaty when revising this document. This version of DIN
820-1 was adopted after several years of negotiations between DIN and the government, and led
to a significant formalization in DIN’s requirements for standardization processes.188
The revised DIN standardization principles state that the constitution of standardization
committees should follow the principle that the different interests are represented in reasonable
proportion to each other (in einem angemessenen Verhältnis zueinander). 189 The document
provides a long, but non-exhaustive list of interests to be considered, such as users, government
authorities, universities and colleges, commerce, crafts, insurance, industrial manufacturers,
testing institutes, and others. Over time, this list has been expanded to include further interests to
be considered, such as environmental groups.
DIN documents also include balance requirements for different aspects of DIN’s work. Section
3.3. of the DIN bylaws (Satzung) states that the composition of DIN’s presiding board (Präsidium)
should be balanced between different interest groups. The ‘Directive for Standardization
Committees’ (Richtlinie für Normenausschüsse) describes the process for creating a
standardization committee; including a requirement to invite representatives of all interests to
participate. There are no specific quotas for the representation of different interests, but there is a
rule that the committee chair and vice-chair should represent different interests.
In spite of the formal requirement to balance the representation of different interests, there is
ample evidence that even after 1975 the interests listed by DIN 820-1 are not equally represented
in DIN standardization committees. 190 In a parliamentary inquiry of 2019, three Bundestag
representatives admonished a stark over-representation of industry in a DIN standardization

187

Id.
According to Luxbacher, the German Federal Ministry of Economics presented DIN with a choice between a
revision of DIN 820-1 that would better protect the representation of consumer interests, or a reinforced government
regulation of standardization. DIN chose the former. LUXBACHER, supra note 179, at 412. Böttger on the other hand
describes the revisions to DIN 820-1 not as changes, but as a formal consecration of DIN’s long-held standards
development principles. He argues that these principles were previously not sufficiently known to the public, leading
to unfounded suspicions, in particular of a one-sided representation of particular interests. L. Böttger, Ursachen und
Wirkungen des Vertrages zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem DIN Deutsches Normungsinstitut e.V
In DIN DEUTSCHES INSTITUT FÜR NORMUNG E.V. (HRSG.), TECHNISCHE NORMUNG UND RECHT 31-42 (1979) (cited
in Helmut Voelzkow, Private Regierungen in der Techniksteuerung: eine sozialwissenschaftliche Analyse der
technischen Normung (1996)).
189
The previous version from 1950 makes no reference to a balance of interests or equivalent or related procedural
principles.
190
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committee in the field of construction.191 In its response, the Federal government stated that by its
treaty with the government, DIN is held to the principle of balanced representation of different
interests required by DIN 820-1. Nevertheless, it is DIN’s prerogative to select the members of
standardization committees, and committee composition is only subject to DIN’s internal appeals
processes, not government oversight. As criticized by the inquiring representatives, the effect of
this remedy is weakened by the fact that the public does not have access to the names of individual
committee members.
Balanced representation of different interests in standardization committees has, however,
been recognized by German courts as critical to the public acceptability of standards. In a 1987
decision involving a standard for traffic noise, the Federal Administrative Court
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht) simultaneously identified the balancing of conflicting interests as
critical to the development of a standard, while casting doubt on the possibility that such balancing
could legitimately be done without the intervention of governmental authority.192 In 1984, the
Federal Administrative Court held that a standard for children’s beds in hospitals could not be
expected to be in conformity with the generally recognized state of the art because the relevant
Technical Committee had failed to hear the technical experts from hospitals.193 Imbalance in the
composition of a technical committee could thus result in a standard losing legitimacy and
authority as representation of the technical state of the art.
UK standardization policy has taken a trajectory similar to the German one. BSI is recognized
as the NSB of the UK through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between BSI and the
government. Similar to the German Staatsvertrag, the BIS MoU grants formal government
recognition and financial support to BSI, and BSI commits to pursue the public interest, involve
relevant government authorities, and uphold certain process principles in its standards
development activities. Unlike the Staatsvertrag, Section 8.3 of the MoU explicitly provides for a
balance of interests requirement:
BSI will seek a fair and acceptable balance of all relevant interests in its work and will
encourage their full participation in producing British Standards and in formulating the UK
191

Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 19/7292 19. Wahlperiode 22.01.2019; Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die
Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Alexander Müller, Frank Sitta, Grigorios Aggelidis, weiterer Abgeordneter und
der Fraktion der FDP
192
“The Technical Committees of DIN are composed in such a way that the necessary technical expertise is at their
disposal. Their members, however, additionally include persons representing the interests of certain branches and
undertakings. Once cannot, therefore, understand the results of their consultations uncritically as solidified expertise
(“geronnener Sachverstand”) or as pure scientific results. On the one hand, one cannot deny that DIN standards are
drafted with expertise and a sense of public responsibility. On the other hand, one must not overlook the fact that
DIN standards are agreements between interested parties that have the aim to influence the market mechanism.
Therefore, the Technical Committees of DIN do not meet the requirements which one must set as regards neutrality
and objectivity of expert witnesses. Special caution with technical standards is needed, where their contents cannot
be classified as extra-legal technical matters (“außerrrechtliche Fachfragen”), but, rather, entail the balancing of
contradicting interests, which would need a democratically legitimised political decision in the form of a formal law
or regulation." Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 22 May 1987, BVerwGE 77, 285-295 (291). Cited from and translation
by HARM SCHEPEL & JOSEF FALKE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF STANDARDISATION IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EC AND
EFTA. VOL. 1 (2000).
193
Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 31 January 1984, Betriebs-Berater 1984, 563 (cited in SCHEPEL & FALKE, supra note
192, at 133.
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positions on proposed European and international standards which not only reflect sound
and modern technical practice but also take fully into account the commercial needs of both
manufacturers and users. […]

BSI thus commits to seek (but not necessarily to achieve) a certain level of balance between
all relevant interests. While the MoU does not offer a direct definition or examples of “all relevant
interests”, it later focuses on the commercial needs of “both manufacturers and users” (a reference
to the historical interest categories of standards development underpinning the traditional notion
of balance of interests).
The MoU references BSI’s “standard for standards” document BS-0 for more specific
standardization principles. The version history of this document dates back to March 1974. It thus
appears that BSI has formalized the principles on which its standardization processes are based at
a very similar time as DIN and ANSI. BS-0 (cited in its latest version of 2016) lists balance of
interests among the defining characteristic of British Standards: “development by balanced and
broadly representative standing committees that retain responsibility for them indefinitely, and that
reach agreement by consensus”. The most explicit reference to balance is made in Section 7.1,
describing the principles of BSI committee work: “BSI has a responsibility to maintain a fair and
comprehensive balance of interests within each committee. The nature of the balance necessarily
varies from committee to committee, but a committee in which one type of interest has a
predominant influence is likely to be regarded as unbalanced. There are areas of work for which it
is difficult to achieve representation from a wide range of interest groups. In these cases it is
important that representation on a committee is not limited to a single interest. As a general rule,
there should be active participation by at least two parties whose interests do not coincide.”
In addition to being required by the MoU, balanced representation of interests on BSI
committees has been seen as critical for the acceptability of BSI standards, including by courts.
An earlier version of BS-0 states:
The quality of standards and their acceptance, particularly by the courts, depends largely
upon the widest and most authoritative representation available. Any imbalance in the
constitution of committees could result in the production of an inadequate standard which,
if discredited by a court decision, might jeopardise the status of standards generally.194

Other European NSBs have similar balance of interest requirements for their activities. In Italy,
“UNI's Articles of Association provide that each Technical Committee should include an expert
appointed by the competent administration and that an adequate balance be arranged between
producers and purchasers in the composition of each Technical Committee.”195 This policy thus
appears to provide for a balance of interests requirement along the traditional definition of interest
groups in standards development.

194
195

SCHEPEL & FALKE, supra note 192, at 107.
Id. at x.
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In France, however, the ministerial order of 16 June 2009 on standardization policy casts a
wider net: it provides that AFNOR will involve all stakeholders in its activities, including
specifically consumer associations, trade unions and SME representatives, as well as academics.196

C.

EUROPEAN STANDARDIZATION POLICY: FROM THE “NEW APPROACH” TO REGULATION
1025/2012

Similar to the NSBs in individual European countries, the European Standards Organizations
(ESO) originated in the private industrial sector and gradually acquired formal recognition by
different European institutions. The cooperation between the European Commission and the ESOs
CEN and CENELEC was handled through “gentlemen’s agreements” until 1979, when CEN and
CENELEC approached the European Commission for formal recognition by the European
Economic Communities (EEC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
The ensuing negotiations took place in the context of a significant transfer of standardization
activities from the national to the European level. In its ruling in Cassis de Dijon and in subsequent
case-law, the the Court of Justice of the European Union held that, in the absence of EU-level
harmonization, a Member State cannot prevent the importation and marketing of a product that
has been lawfully produced and marketed in another Member State, unless that first Member State
can invoke a higher public-interest objective. 197 In standardization terms, the CJEU held that free
movement of goods under EU law implies mutual recognition of national standards, where they
pursue equivalent objectives. Accordingly, the Cassis de Dijon line of case-law gave a strong
impetus to pursue standardization at the EU level, in order to build trust amongst Member States
and remove impediments to trade.
The current EU standardization policy was born in the early 1980s. As with many EU economic
policies, it must accordingly be seen through the prism of the internal market. Standardization is a
means to achieve the internal market. Furthermore it is also a means to ensure the success of EU
industry, both internally (by enabling firms to reach a higher scale within the EU) and externally
(by riding on EU standards to improve their competitive position abroad).
Efforts to establish harmonization and mutual recognition of technical standards resulted in a
Council Directive in March 1983,198 and the ‘New Approach’ to Standardization in 1985, 199 both
of which became building blocks in the large-scale integration project of the Single European Act
in 1986. Pursuant to the New Approach, instead of pursuing the harmonization of standards across
the EU via direct legislation, the EU would issue general legislation setting out the essential
requirements that must be complied with and mandate the detailed standardization work to

196

Ministerial Order (Décret) 2009-697 of 16 June 2009 on standardization, JORF no 138:6 of 17 June 2009, art. 8
and 14.
197
CJEU, Judgment of 20 February 1979, Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für
Branntwein (‘Cassis de Dijon’) [1979] ECR 649.
198
Directive 83/189 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and
regulations [1983] OJ L 109/8.
199
Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a new approach to technical harmonization and standards [1985] OJ C
136/1.
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ESOs.200 In this context, the ESOs CEN and CENELEC became increasingly important, as did the
harmonization of the standards development processes of their members, the NSBs of different
European countries.
The negotiations between CEN, CENELEC, the European Commission, and EFTA resulted in
an agreement of recognition in 1984, the ‘Memorandum No 4, General guidelines for cooperation
between the [European Commission] and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the
European standards institutions’. As part of the Memorandum, CEN and CENELEC committed
to allow for the representation of representatives of different interests: “In order to establish the
grounds for a large recognition of the importance of European Standards, CEN and CENELEC
will ensure that the interested circles, especially public authorities, manufacturers, users,
consumers, trade unions, can, if they so wish, be effectively associated in the drawing-up of
European Standards: the Commission will, should the case arise, help in the definition of the
appropriate modalities”. This requirement thus constitutes “balance as openness”, in the sense that
CEN and CENELEC are not required to remedy an imbalance in the representation of different
interests that may arise from different degrees to which ‘interested circles’ are willing or attuned
to participate in standards development. Indeed at the time national standardization organisations
were seen as the main vehicle for the involvement of these interests.201 The list of interests to be
considered is a mix of traditional (users, manufacturers) and societal (consumers, trade unions)
interest categories.
This Memorandum was subsequently referenced in the Council Resolution of 1985
establishing the ‘New Approach’ to European standardization.202 In the annexes to the Resolution,
the Council emphasizes the significance of the balance requirement set out in the Memorandum
by extending its application to any other body other than CEN/CENELEC that might be entrusted
with the development of harmonized European standards.203
One such body is the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the third ESO,
which was created in 1988. The creation of ETSI occurred after the New Approach. It is the direct
consequence of the liberalization drive in European telecommunications, which began with a 1987
Green Paper issued by the European Commission. 204 In the 1987 Green Paper, the European
Commission recognized the strategic significance of quick and efficient standardization in order
to open up the European telecommunications market, modernize the industry and catch up with
the U.S. and Japan.205 Standardization efforts were hampered by the need to coordinate between
the IT industry, which worked through NSBs within the CEN/CENELEC structure, and the
telecommunications sector, where standardization was carried out by the state monopoly
providers, acting through the Conférence européenne des postes et télécommunications (CEPT).
200

Id.
See Council Resolution of 4 November 1988 on the improvement of consumer involvement in standardization
[1988] OJ C 293/1.
202
See, note 199, supra.
203
Council Resolution 1988, supra note 201, at 6.
204
European Commission, Towards a Dynamic European Economy: Green Paper on the Development of the
Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment COM(1987)290 (30 June 1987) [1987 Green
Paper].
205
This was the time when a group of operators and manufacturers, known as the Groupe Spécial Mobile (GSM),
was completing work on a new and promising European standard for 2nd-generation mobile communications.
201
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In addition, since the Commission was proposing to separate the regulatory and operational
functions of the state and monopoly providers on the way to liberalizing the market, the CEPT
approach was no longer sustainable.206 The rationale for the creation of ETSI is encapsulated in a
few sentences:
[CEPT and CEN/CENELEC] have to continue to work on the basis of non-industrial
working methods, based on working group meetings and part-time availability of [publicsector] experts. Co-ordination with industry which is now indispensable, has been
strengthened, but is still not on a permanent working level […] It is now time to consider
[…] the best way to establish industrial working methods based on permanent teams,
including an increased contribution by industrial and user experts […] The only efficient
solution for creating a permanent basis will be the establishment of a stable physical centre.
Such a European Telecommunications Standards Institute could provide the permanent
core functions on which the acceleration of standards work can be based.207

In line with the European Commission proposal, ETSI breaks with the model of
CEN/CENELEC, in favor of direct involvement of stakeholders. From the very start, the EU
institutions wanted ETSI to regroup manufacturers and operators. Accordingly, companies and
other stakeholders can acquire individual membership in ETSI, and participate directly in many
ETSI processes. ETSI’s Directives and Rules of Procedures (RoP) divide individual members into
specifically defined categories: “Administrations; Other Governmental Bodies; National
Standards Organizations; Network Operators; Manufacturers; Users; Service Providers; Research
Bodies; Universities; Consultancy Companies/Partnerships; Others.” These categories are used to
support certain (limited) clauses in support of a balance between these different interest groups;
e.g. the chair and vice-chair of the General Assembly should not be representatives of the same
category (RoP 4.3), “The General Assembly may decide to allocate a number of reserved seats on
the Board to ensure representation of specific membership categories (e.g. User, SME).” (Rules of
Operation, para. 2), and “Composition of the Finance Committee … as well as duration of the
tenure of its members shall be fixed by the General Assembly in order to allow, with a minimum
size, for fair representation of the various categories of ETSI members.” (Art. 2.1. of the Financial
Regulations). For the purposes of determining membership dues and voting rights, members of
certain categories (Small and Medium Enterprise (SME), University, User Association, Trade
Association) are also grouped into the lowest class of membership, whereas the dues and voting
rights of members in other categories are calculated as a function of the company’s annual
turnover. These rules thus provide for some minimal balance between different categories, while
at the same time vesting the bulk of the decision-making power with the largest companies among
ETSI’s membership.

206

Within CEPT, state monopoly providers were represented as national telecommunications administrations, in
charge of regulation and service provision. The Green Paper proposed to turn CEPT into the association for the
regulatory elements of the State monopoly providers, to the exclusion of the newly-separated operational firms (that
would go on to form ETNO). Keeping standardization within CEPT would have kept service providers out of the
loop.
207
1987 Green Paper, supra note 204 at 112-113.
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The European Commission pushed for a centralized European standardization system in its
1990 Green Paper on European Standardization.208 Without a doubt, the overarching goal of this
policymaking round was to increase the efficiency of standardization in the EU by reforming
standardization processes and shifting the center of gravity away from NSBs towards ESOs. If that
were to occur, however, the ESOs would need to strengthen the representation of non-industrial
interests in their midst, in order to ensure that European-level standardization is accountable and
legitimate. Indeed at the time CEN and CENELEC relied on NSBs to achieve that representation
at a national level, and ETSI comprised mostly industry members. 209 While the Commission
proposals for greater centralization were rejected,210 that policymaking cycle nevertheless resulted
in an agreement on a set of principles for ESOs, including transparency, openness, consensus,
independence of vested interests and efficiency.211 ESOs were also urged to work more closely
with “economic and social partners”, including SMEs.
In the Report that opened the subsequent policymaking round at the turn of the 21st century,
the Commission remained concerned primarily with the efficiency of European standardization,
but it also emphasized accountability, in keeping with the ongoing debates on governance in the
European Union after the Maastricht Treaty. 212 The Commission set out its definition of
accountability, which builds on the principles listed in the previous paragraph, as they emerged
from the previous policy cycle. There was no mention of balance as such, but nonetheless the
statements made reflect a concern for both traditional and societal balance. Accountability
requires, among others, that a “standard is supported by all major interested parties”, that
“European-based interest groups [have access] to policy setting activities” and that “all interested
parties [can] participate effectively in standardization work, under fair conditions”.213
When it comes to specific recommendations for improvement, the Commission is concerned
with societal balance first and foremost, requesting that CEN and CENELEC include Europeanbased workers, consumers, environmental and industry representatives in “strategic discussions
and the elaboration of policy”.214 Accountability is used in the analysis as a distinctive feature that
separates ESOs and NSBs from private consortia, that in the eyes of the Commission operate
efficiently but lack legitimacy and accountability.215
The European Parliament 216 and the Council 217 both endorsed the Commission policy
proposals. In particular, the Council in its Resolution set the aim of a “high degree of acceptability
as a result of the full involvement of all relevant interested parties in the standardisation process”.
208

European Commission, Green Paper on the Development of European Standardization : Action for Faster
Technological Integration in Europe COM(90)456 (8 October 1990).
209
Id. at 35.
210
The Commission found no support amongst stakeholders: see the summary of the round of consultations in the
Commission Communication on standardization in the European economy [1992] OJ C 96/2.
211
Council Resolution of 18 June 1992 on the role of European standardization in the European economy [1992]
OJ C 173/1.
212
Commission Report on efficiency and accountability in European standardization under the New Approach
COM(1998)291 (13 May 1998) [hereinafter 1998 Commission Report].
213
Id. at 4.
214
Id. at 10.
215
Id. at 5.
216
European Parliament, Resolution of 12 February 1999 [1999] OJ C 150/624.
217
Council Resolution of 28 October 1999 on the role of standardization in Europe [2000] OJ C 141/1.
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It invited “the European standards bodies to develop or improve existing mechanisms,
supplementing consensus at national level, allowing them to give broad consideration to the
positions expressed by the various interest groups during the standardisation process” and stressed
“that interested parties such as workers, consumers, and environmental interest groups should be
fully involved in the standardization process at all relevant stages” Perhaps more clearly than the
Commission in its Report, the Council did not dwell on the traditional notion of balance as parity
between the representation or influence of different commercial stakeholder groups. Rather, it
emphasizes the role of societal balance, and in particular adequate representation of potentially
under-represented interests.
One notable offspring of the 1999 Council Resolution was a Commission paper exploring the
interplay between the European principles set out above and the principles found at international
level in WTO law.218 There, the Commission noted that the WTO principles and the European
principles are largely similar, yet it added that “it is important… to balance the interests not only
of industry, but also consumer concerns, health and safety considerations, environment aspects
and concerns of… SMEs”. 219 The traditional notion of balance is once more explicitly
supplemented by societal balance, to which the Commission invites the WTO (and by the same
token international SDOs) to give greater weight. The Council approved the Commission analysis
in a subsequent set of conclusions.220
The European emphasis on societal balance is also reflected in the current version of the CEN
CENELEC Guide 4 of 2003 on the ‘Cooperation between CEN, CENELEC and ETSI and the
European Commission and the European Free Trade Association’ (the successor of Memorandum
4 signed in 1984). The paragraph on balance of interests now reads as follows:
For their part, the European Commission and EFTA expect the European Standards
Organizations CEN, CENELEC and ETSI to:
[…]
Ensure that structures and procedures allow for the highest possible degree of openness,
transparency and representativeness. Procedures should be transparent and ensure
independence from vested interests. Further efforts should be made to increase the
participation of interested circles, especially public authorities, manufacturers, small and
medium-sized enterprises, consumers, workers and environmental interest groups, at the
national and European level in the drafting of standards and other deliverables and in
ensuring their views are adequately taken into account.

From 1984 to 2003, there were thus some noteworthy changes. First, the list of interests has
changed: while “users” were removed as a group, SMEs and environmental interest groups were
added, and trade unions replaced by “workers”. Replacing the traditional interest category “users”
with societal groups such as SMEs and environmental interest groups is indicative of the
transformation of the underlying notion of balance. In addition, the European Commission and
218

Commission Staff Working Paper on European Policy Principles on International Standardisation
SEC(2001)1296 (26 July 2001). This Paper followed a request from Council in its 1999 Resolution, ibid. The WTO
principles are found in the decision of 10 November 2000 taken under the TBT Agreement, WTO/G/TBT/9.
219
Staff Working Paper, id, at 4, 8.
220
Council Conclusions of 1 March 2002 on standardisation [2002] OJ C 66/1.
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EFTA expect increasingly proactive steps from CEN and CENELEC to achieve greater societal
balance. While the earlier version of the agreement merely required the ESOs to “ensure that
[different interest groups] can, if they so wish, effectively be associated”, the version of 2003 states
that “Further efforts should be made to increase the participation of”. The balance requirement
thus morphed from a principle of equal rights to participate to a responsibility to ensure adequate
representation, in particular of potentially under-represented groups. The new version also features
a new principle of independence of the ESOs from vested interests; and no longer suggests that
the Commission could help in defining the modalities for the representation of different interests.
Perhaps the most striking change is that the status quo of broad representation of different
interests in European standardization is now explicitly portrayed as unsatisfactory. Rather than
holding the SDOs to their own, self-determined principles, the European institutions request the
ESOs to initiate changes (“further efforts should be made”).
This increased emphasis on societal balance, and the requirement to proactively encourage
greater representation of certain stakeholder groups, is reflected in CEN’s Internal Regulations
[applicable to CEN members, i.e. the European NSBs]:
The Member shall keep an impartial and independent position by ensuring an appropriate
balance of the interests represented in the standards development process, i.e. private and
public, economic, societal and environmental interests. The Member’s rules shall grant the
same right to all stakeholders actively involved in the standardization work to express their
opinions and to have them duly taken into account.
The Member‘s rules shall ensure that all contributions are duly considered without
favouring or ignoring any of them.” First, the list of interests (private and public, economic
etc.) clearly refers to societal balance rather than balance between different industrial
stakeholder groups; second, the requirement requires (1) impartiality of the organization
itself, and (2) equal rights to participate for different interest groups (but does not seem to
require parity in representation).

Other stipulations in the Internal Regulation are also relevant, in particular:
“2.3 Principle of appropriate representation of the stakeholders' interests in the Technical
Bodies - The Member shall have a process in place to identify and take into account the
needs of all stakeholders, with a view to facilitating appropriate representation and
participation.”

The principle of “sustainable development”, despite its name, is also a form of balance
requirement:
“Sustainable development is a means of expressing the broader expectations of society as
a whole. This includes promoting and facilitating the involvement of all stakeholders,
including potentially under-represented stakeholders such as SMEs and representatives of
societal interests, in the development of standards, so as to ensure representation in a real
multi-stakeholder-process.”
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The next policy round followed from the EU-level discussions on growth, jobs and
innovation.221 A European Parliament resolution222 set the tone for a complete overhaul of the legal
framework for standardization in the EU. The strategic study accompanying the proposal for what
would become Regulation 2015/2012 reaffirms the European approach to balance, which focuses
on societal balance but also alludes to traditional balance. As the Commission states, “strong
consensus is vital for a standard to be accepted and used by industry. Acceptance of the standard
by other stakeholders is important in those areas where standards are used in support of public
policy and legislation”.223 Interestingly, as part of the first plank – traditional balance expressed as
consensus amongst the industry stakeholders – the Commission insists on adequate representation
of SMEs, through the NSBs (for CEN and CENELEC) and directly within ETSI. The second
plank, societal balance, is particularly relevant when standards touch upon public policy
(performance standards), and it involves better representation of consumers, trade unions,
environmental NGOs, among others.224 In addition, the Commission signals a change in how fora
and consortia are treated under EU law: whereas 10 years earlier they were dismissively considered
to fall short on legitimacy, they are now seen as a useful source of complementary standards, as
long as these fora and consortia follow the same “quality criteria” as ESOs, including openness,
transparency and neutrality.225
These policy discussions hence did not lead to significant changes in the basic principles
(emphasis on societal balance, proactive steps towards sufficient representation of certain groups).
These principles underlie the enactment that arose out of the 2008-2012 policy round, now the
current legislative framework for standardization in Europe, namely Regulation 1025/2012.226 The
recitals to Regulation 1025/2012 explain how stakeholder representation is essential to the success
of standardization.227 Stakeholders include representatives of environmental interests, consumer
interests, employee interests (trade unions in particular) and SMEs. Regulation 1025/2012 governs
the participation of stakeholders in standardization.228 In order to ensure meaningful participation,
the Regulation even provides for EU funding of stakeholder organisations for those purposes.229
Regulation 1025/2012 remains focused on participation in proceedings as a way to ensure
representation. It does not require that ESOs grant any particular stakeholders voting rights.230 The
only explicit mention of a balance requirement in Regulation 1025/2012 can be found in Annex
221

See the Commission communication “Towards an increased contribution from standardization to innovation in
Europe” COM(2008)133 (11 March 2008) and the White Paper “Modernising ICT Standardisation in the EU – The
Way Forward” COM(2009)324 (3 July 2009), which initiated the discussions.
222
European Parliament Resolution of 21 October 2010 on the future of European standardisation [2012] OJ C
70E/56.
223
Commission Communication “A strategic vision for European standards: Moving forward to enhance and
accelerate the sustainable growth of the European economy by 2020” COM(2011)311 (1 June 2011) at 11 (see also
id. at 5).
224
On that point, the Commission advocates looking to the ISO “alternative production line” (used for ISO 26000)
for inspiration. Id. at 12.
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Id. at 15-17.
226
Regulation 1025/2012 on European standardisation [2012] OJ L 316/12.
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II, which sets out the conditions under which ICT standards developed by SDOs other than ESOs
can be recognized for public procurement purposes in the EU.231 In order to be considered, a
standard must have been developed by a standards body which fulfills a number of criteria,
including that “participation of all relevant categories of interested parties was sought with a view
to achieving balance”.
Following the enactment of Regulation 1025/2012, these basic principles remained unchanged.
In the subsequent policy round, launched in 2016,232 the emphasis was shifted to implementation
and integration at the EU level.233 The ESOs, the NSBs, the Commission and the stakeholders
(industry, SMEs, workers, environmental organizations and citizen groups) together form the
European Standardisation System (ESS). In 2016, the Commission launched a Joint Initiative on
Standardisation (JIS) to improve the functioning of the ESS.234 Amongst its first set of actions, the
JIS was tasked with fostering inclusiveness, transparency and effective participation of all
stakeholders in the ESS, facilitating participation of all stakeholders at the national level, and
improving the representation of European SMEs and societal stakeholders’ interests in
international standardization processes. 235 In other words, a high-level forum including all
stakeholders was created outside of the established SDOs – and to some extent above them – in
order to put pressure on those SDOs, at national, European and international levels, to improve
stakeholder representation. Coordination has also been improved through the introduction of an
Annual Union Work Programme (AUWP) for European standardization, wherein the Commission
communicates its priorities to all stakeholders.
Over the last 35 years of European standardization policy, as outlined in the previous
paragraphs, the EU has had to deal with significant changes in the standardization ecosystem and
with the spillover from major EU-level policy debates. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the EU-wide
drive for regulatory efficiency and trade liberalization led to the New Approach; in terms of
balance, the emphasis was on traditional balance between potentially conflicting industry interests.
Such balance was traditionally ensured within the NSBs that made up CEN and CENELEC. Yet
when ETSI was created as a new, third ESO, it followed a different model, whereby balance was
directly sought in the membership of the ESO. The co-existence of these two different models –
national representation for CEN and CENELEC, direct industry membership for ETSI – made it
unavoidable that they would be compared. As a consequence, EU standardization policy has been
trying to “lift the veil” of national representation ever since the 1990s, in order to compel NSBs to
meet EU-level expectations, in particular as regards procedural principles linked to balance, such
as openness, transparency and consensus.

231

Id., Art. 13.
The round was launched with a “standardisation package”, i.e. a set of policy and administrative documents
issued by the Commission in June 2016. The central piece was the Communication “European Standards for the
21st Century” COM(2016)358 (1 June 2016).
233
See European Parliament Resolution of 4 July 2017 on European standards for the 21st century,
P8_TA(2017)0278, point 16 (expressing satisfaction with the content of Regulation 1025/2012 as far as balance is
concerned, and calling for better implementation).
234
The initiative had been announced in the European Commission Communication Upgrading the Single Market:
more opportunities for people and business, COM(2015)550 (28 October 2015) at 12.
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In the late 1990s and 2000s, legitimacy and accountability came to the fore, in the wake of the
post-Maastricht governance crisis in the EU. This is where the EU started to emphasize societal
balance, in addition to traditional balance. The two were often bundled together in policy
documents, but since the early 2000s the key policy documents posit that traditional balance
corresponds to what is required under WTO law, and societal balance is an additional European
requirement. The EU has gone very far in order to ensure that weaker stakeholders are represented
not only in standardization processes, but also in SDO governance. The main stakeholders in the
eyes of the EU whose adequate representation should be ensured are trade unions, consumer
associations, environmental NGOs, and SMEs. Since the mid-2000s, standardization has gained
in strategic significance for the EU, especially when innovativeness became an EU-wide priority.
EU institutions were forced to acknowledge that standards development – especially in the ICT
sector – takes place in large part outside of established SDOs, in industry-driven fora and consortia.
Societal balance was then put forward as a key differentiating factor between established SDOs
and their newer industry-driven counterparts. Ultimately, it became a condition for the latter to
achieve recognition within the EU, as set out in Regulation 1025/2012. Nowadays, one of the main
functions of the overarching coordination bodies, such as the Joint Initiative on Standardisation
(in general) or the Multi-Stakeholder Platform (for ICT standards specifically),236 is to provide a
space where all stakeholders can be represented and heard, and from which SDOs can be prodded
to achieve societal balance.
Throughout the different phases of its development, the framework for standardization
regulation in Europe has focused on the officially recognized NSBs and ESOs. Just as in the U.S.,
industry stakeholders however often found it advantageous to create additional fora for
standardization. One such organization is the Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) project, which
resulted in 1991 from a joint initiative by broadcasters, consumer electronics manufacturers and
regulatory bodies. Drafting a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for DVB “meant that
commercial competitors needed to appreciate their common requirements and agendas. Trust and
mutual respect had to be established.”237 As a contribution to creating this necessary trust between
different interest groups, the MoU provides for specific mechanisms to balance their interests. In
particular, “to ensure a balanced representation of views from broadcasters, operators,
manufacturers and administrations”, the MoU prescribes a specific composition of DVB’s central
governance body, with specific numbers of seats reserved for each “constituency”.238 Furthermore,
no decision can be adopted that has not been approved by a majority of the representatives of each
constituency.239
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See Decision of 28 November 2011 setting up the European multi-stakeholder platform on ICT standardisation
[2011] OJ C 349/4.
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https://dvb.org/about/history/, last consulted on 1/17/2021.
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EU COMPETITION POLICY AND BALANCE IN SDO IPR POLICIES

In parallel with the development of EU standardization policy as part of the internal market,
EU competition law also started to be applied to standardization activities.
Starting with the XOpen case in 1996, 240 the Commission became concerned that
standardization would be used in order to give an advantage to one competitor (or one set of
competitors) over others. It was perceived that the remedy for this risk is openness and
participation. Hence the Commission insisted on ensuring that all interested parties were able to
participate in standardization, and that interested manufacturers had access to each standard, in
order to implement it in their products. The Commission’s 2000 Horizontal Guidelines sum up the
practice until then: if participation in standardization is “unrestricted and transparent” and the
standards are voluntary, then there is no concern under competition law. 241 The Commission
emphasizes participation first and foremost, rather than any more specific definition of balance
between stakeholder interests: all competitors must have been involved in the discussion, and other
stakeholders should also be at the table.242
With the standardization of mobile telecommunications technology and the creation of ETSI
in 1988, the intersection between standardization and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) became
an important focus of European standardization policy. In its 1992 follow-up communication on
the 1990 Green Paper, the European Commission focused exclusively on the interface between
standardization and IPR. These policy efforts took place in the context of debates within ETSI
regarding its IPR policy, opposing the interests of network operators (favoring strict licensing
obligations for SEPs) and manufacturers (defending the rights of patent owners).243 In March 1993,
ETSI’s General Assembly accepted an IPR policy that was heavily criticized by patent-centric
manufacturers. Observers at the time alleged that the policy was only accepted due to an imbalance
in the representation of manufacturers’ and operators’ interests within ETSI.244 The policy faced
significant resistance, including a competition law complaint by a business association
representing manufacturers to the European Commission. The European Commission however did
not decide the merits of the complaint, as ETSI revised its policy and abandoned the controversial
provisions in November 1994 “in order to achieve greater consensus amongst ETSI members.”245
ETSI’s new IPR policy reflected a commitment to balance: “In achieving this objective, the ETSI
IPR Policy seeks a balance between the needs of standardization for public use in the field of
telecommunications and the rights of the owners of IPRs.” The area of IPR is the only context in
which ETSI’s process documents make explicit mention of a balance requirement.

240

Decision of 15 December 1986, X/Open Group [1986] OJ L 35/36.
Guidelines on the applicability of Article [101 TFEU] to horizontal cooperation agreements [2001] OJ C3/2 at
para. 163.
242
Id. at 172.
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See generally Iversen, E. J. (1999). Standardization and Intellectual Property Rights: ETSI's controversial search
for new IPR-procedures.
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Rudi Bekkers, Geert Duysters, Bart Verspagen, Intellectual property rights and standardization: The case of
GSM, 26 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL. 171, 180 (2002) (“The proposal was accepted mainly due to the considerable
power that former telecom administrations have in ETSI, compared to that of the manufacturers and other actors”
(citing Besen, 1990; Paffen, 1996; CBEMA, 1993)).
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Perhaps due to the controversies at ETSI, the DVB project was careful in developing its IPR
policy in the mid-1990s to balance the leadership of the subcommittees charged with developing
an IPR policy between representatives of equipment manufacturers and broadcasters, the two
principal commercial constituencies involved in the market.246
The Horizontal Guidelines were renewed in 2010, taking into account the Commission practice
on IPR policies in SDOs. 247 The general analysis set out in the 2000 Guidelines is further
developed, with the emphasis being put once again on participation as the main path to achieving
balance:248
In particular, to ensure unrestricted participation the rules of the standard-setting
organisation would need to guarantee that all competitors in the market or markets affected
by the standard can participate in the process leading to the selection of the standard. The
standard-setting organisations would also need to have objective and non-discriminatory
procedures for allocating voting rights as well as, if relevant, objective criteria for selecting
the technology to be included in the standard [emphasis in the original].

The concept of balance comes into the discussion when it comes to the more specific issue of
the IPR policy. The 2010 Guidelines define a safe harbor for SDOs complying with certain criteria,
including a “balanced and clear IPR policy”. This safe harbor entails that these SDOs “would
normally fall outside the scope of Article 101(1)”, i.e. not violate competition law prohibitions
against restrictive agreements. According to the Guidelines, balancing would refer to the balance
between the interests of different groups of participants (IPR holders, pure manufacturers,
vertically-integrated firms) in the IPR policy. 249 The Communication on SEP of 2017 greatly
insists on the need for a “balanced approach” (10 mentions), yet it does not go any further than the
2010 Horizontal Guidelines in defining balance.250

V.

THE MEANING OF BALANCE IN STANDARDIZATION

Despite a widespread recognition that some degree of balancing of interests is appropriate and
desirable in standards development, the historical account set forth in Parts II, III, and IV
demonstrates that this important feature of standardization has developed along multiple
independent pathways both in the U.S. and Europe. Variations are observed in both the
conceptualization of whose interests should be weighed in any effort toward balancing, as well as
the standard against which balancing efforts should be legally measured and assessed. We discuss
each of these axes of comparison, and then offer our observations and conclusions.
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TYPES OF INTERESTS TO BE BALANCED
Traditional and Societal Balance Categories

The traditional view of SDO interest balancing involved producers and users of standardized
products, such as steel makers and railway companies. This traditional requirement seeks to
balance representation of commercial stakeholder groups with direct, yet divergent, interests in a
standard. Many SDOs seek balanced representation of these different groups in order to elicit the
relevant technical information and ensure acceptance of future standards by the principal
stakeholder constituencies.
More recently, the scope of the traditional notion of balance has been extended to other
constituencies, reflecting more diverse commercial relationships in the marketplace. In addition
to producers and users, a perceived imbalance between producers and certifiers arose in the NSS
case, 251 in which a testing service company, NSS, sued the Anti-Malware Testing Standards
Organization, Inc. (AMTSO), an SDO that develops cybersecurity software standards, and several
of its members, alleging that they violated the Sherman Act by colluding to develop standards that
disadvantaged certain testing vendors and then refusing to deal with vendors who did not comply
with those standards. In spite of the diversity of interest categories potentially involved, the
traditional balance requirement focuses on situations in which the opposing stakeholder interests
are largely corporate and industrial concerns, and the different stakeholders actively participate in
standards development.
In addition to seeking a balance of interests between different industrial and commercial
concerns at different points in the supply chain, a broader notion of the need for societal
participation in standardization emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Unlike the traditional balance
requirement, which SDOs adopted as a means of ensuring acceptance of their standards by relevant
(and powerful) stakeholder groups, the notion of societal balance originated in an external critique
of private standards development and an effort to legitimize the private assumption of regulatory
duties.252 While the concern with societal balance in standards development is not limited to any
one class of standards, it is heightened with respect to standards that directly affect consumer
safety. In addition, the formalization of societal balance requirements is often linked to the
participation of government agencies in standards development and government’s use of voluntary
industry standards for regulation and other purposes. In Europe, the representation of underrepresented societal interest groups in standards development is enshrined in the key enactment
governing standardization in the EU, namely Regulation 1025/2012.253

251

NSS Labs, Inc. v. Crowdstrike, Inc., Case No. 3:18-cv-05711 (N.D. Cal., filed Sep. 18, 2018).
See CATHERINE E. RUDDER, A. LEE FRITSCHLER & YON JUNG CHOI, PUBLIC POLICY MAKING BY PRIVATE
ORGANIZATIONS: CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 118 (2016) (“the democratic legitimacy of private
and public-private [standards in the area of food safety] should be improved by increasing its transparency and
broadening the voices involved in policy making”).
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There is significant variation in the categories that are explicitly mentioned by different SDOs
and regulatory instruments in this regard. An early and prominent societal group whose interests
SDOs seek to account for was consumers. ANSI and ASTM in the U.S. and DIN and BSI in
Europe are examples of SDOs offering opportunities for the representation of consumer interests
in standardization activities and SDO governance. 254 Other societal interests considered in
standardization activities may include environmental interest groups, labor, and science.
Nevertheless, discussions of balance typically focus on the opposition between industry as a whole
and other interests, such as consumers, government, civil society, labor, etc. The objective of the
balance requirement is not to achieve a balance among all identified categories, but to prevent one
interest – industry – from using standardization to impose its preferences on the rest of society.255
In some discussions, industry is sliced into different groups, most notably small and large
corporations, where SMEs are added to the list of interests that need to be protected against
domination of standards by large companies.
Another difference resides in the means that have been contemplated to achieve the desired
balance. The traditional balance requirement sought to reconcile the interests of different groups
that actively engage in standards development; as noted above, some standards organizations
pursued this balance by numerically equalizing the composition of standardization committees
among experts affiliated with each group. Some proposals made in the 1970s seeking a more
general balance of interests in standards development either did not explicitly mention balanced
committee composition, or expressly described it as an inadequate tool for achieving the desired
balance. Other proposals however explicitly refer to balance in membership composition as a
necessary means of ensuring adequate representation.256
Extending the traditional practice of balancing committee composition to the more recent,
broader lists of societal interest categories, however, created fundamental theoretical and practical
problems.257 Unlike the representatives of industrial users and producers of standardized products,
there are few qualified experts volunteering to represent consumers, labor, or environmental
concerns in standardization. As observed by Dieter Ernst and collaborators, “standardization is a
highly knowledge-intensive activity that requires well educated and experienced engineers and

254

See notes 31, 50-53 and 162-163, supra, and accompanying text.
This is also consistent with ASTM’s explicit quota requirement, seeking to ensure that representatives of
producers do not outnumber representatives of all other groups. See notes 25-26, supra, and accompanying text.
256
An example of an attempt to enforce adequate representation of societal interests through a quota system is the
1968 report of the select committee on small businesses of the House of Representatives: “It is the subcommittee’s
conclusion that consumer representatives should be in the preponderance on standards committees.” – a far cry from
the actual representation of consumers in standardization processes then and today. Final Report of the Select
Committee on Small Businesses of the House of Representatives, supra note 31, at 181,
257
Hamilton, Prospects, supra note 57, at x.
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other professionals”, 258 skills that are often lacking outside of the firms directly engaged in
standardization activity.259
Moreover, those purporting to speak on behalf of a particular interest category can not
necessarily be trusted to represent all, or even most, members of that category. As Rudder and
collaborators observe, “To call a representative ‘public’ without a clear demonstration of the
person’s connection to the public is meaningless. Can there be meaningful representation of the
public outside of free and fair elections…?” 260 Moreover, even academics and government
officials have been accused of representing partisan interests in standardization activities, further
eroding the value of this form of representation.261
Compounding the difficulty of identifying willing, qualified and unbiased representatives of
broader social categories is the inherent difficulty that such individuals face when trying to
participate in many formal standardization activities. These difficulties include the substantial
financial and time commitments required to participate, the difficulty of gaining admittance to
relevant SDO committees, and the risk that their views, once expressed, will be sidelined or
ignored by professional standards-developers.262
Given the difficulties of achieving societal balance through quotas and other formal
mechanisms, the European Commission and some SDOs, such as ASTM and IETF, provide
financial support to enhance representation of societal interests (e.g. consumers and representatives
of developing countries) in relevant standardization activities.263 Yet these sporadic efforts have
not resulted in significant levels of participation by representatives of such constituencies in most
standardization activities.264
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Dieter Ernst, Heejin Lee & Jooyoung Kim, Standards, Innovation and Latecomer Economic Development:
Conceptual Issues and Policy Challenges, 38 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 853, 855 (2014). See also Morris,
supra note 160, at 8-9 (describing challenges to participation in standards development by public policy advocates).
Given this dearth of public expertise in standardization, in some cases large corporate interests purport to represent
consumer interests, as was the case at ANSI, when the Sears Roebuck Corporation sat on its Consumer Council.
Hamilton, Roles, supra note 26, at 1385 n. 157.
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This being said, some standardization activities are driven not by large ICT firms, but by interested individuals
and non-corporate communities. For example, IEEE Working Group P2890 - Recommended Practice for
Provenance of Indigenous Peoples’ Data (https://standards.ieee.org/project/2890.html) was formed by academics,
philanthropic organizations and members of indigenous communities, and does not have substantial corporate
involvement. However, the engagement of this working group’s members with standardization is not likely to lead
to their greater involvement with more complex ICT standards, as their goals are relatively specific to this project,
and not directed generally toward product or technology standardization.
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RUDDER ET AL., supra note 252, at 155.
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FTC 1983 Report, supra note 82, at x.
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See TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE
WORLD ECONOMY 222-24 (2011); CARGILL, supra note 153, at 108 (“while the [standardization] process is open to
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See BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 262, at 222 (“consumer participation in international product standardization
… is strikingly weak”); JRC Report, supra note 2, at 120.
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Vertical versus Horizontal Stakeholder Categories

The relationship among the traditional categories of interests to be balanced is largely vertical.
That is, producers of standardized products – automotive parts, electrical components, synthetic
fibers – stand in a vertical relationship to the industrial purchasers of those products –
manufacturers of cars, computers and apparel, as well as wholesalers and retailers. These industrial
purchasers likewise stand in a vertical relationship to consumers, workers, environmental interests,
and the like. And, in the case of NSS, producers of cybersecurity solutions stand in a vertical
relationship to security certifying bodies that assess their products.
Over the past few decades, however, there have been increasing calls for SDO balance among
competing horizontal interests. In some cases, individual firms considered that the standardization
process had been skewed in favor of a competitor from the same industry (as alleged in ASME v.
Hydrolevel).265 In other cases, SDO processes were found to be imbalanced between different
groups of suppliers producing goods that could be used for the same purpose, such as the steel and
plastic conduit manufacturers in Allied Tube.266
According to some organizations’ definitions, the requirement not to skew standardization
processes in favor of individual firms or individual technical solutions is the goal of a separate
procedural requirement – absence of dominance – which must be distinguished from balance.267
Nevertheless, other organizations define balance as a state in which “standards activities are not
exclusively dominated by any particular person, company or interest group.”268
Disputes over technical choices, and the exclusion of one vendor’s solution over another’s,
continue to arise in standards-development, with associated antitrust claims. Such claims were
raised, for example, in Addamax v.OSF, 269 TruePosition v. Ericsson 270 and Golden Bridge v.
Motorola.271 These disputes involved allegations of an imbalance in the standardization process,
resulting e.g. from a partisan exercise of the working group chair function, or deliberate “stacking
the room” and/or “vote stuffing” by SDO members. But while the plaintiff in each of these cases
alleged anticompetitive collusion by members of an SDO, and in some cases by the SDO itself,
the issue of SDO balancing of interests was not addressed by the courts in any of these cases.
Of course, actions skewing the balance between competitors also may result in an imbalance
between interest categories protected by an SDO’s balance requirements. Nevertheless, this does
not imply that traditional or legal balance requirements obligate SDOs to balance the membership
of standardization committees between competing firms or proponents of competing technology
solutions. Indeed, such a requirement would seem to undermine the ability of SDOs to make
technical choices. Standards organizations exist to select among different technical solutions such
265

See notes 103-106, supra, and accompanying text.
See notes 108-116, supra, and accompanying text.
267
See e.g. ANSI’s Guidance on Balance and Outreach document from 2016: “Balance and a lack of dominance
are two distinct considerations. The existence of a balanced consensus body does not preclude the exercise of
dominance. Similarly, the existence of a less than perfectly balanced consensus body does not necessarily reflect a
process in which dominance automatically occurs.” ANSI Balance Guidance, supra note 143.
268
See OpenStand Principles, supra note 161.
269
Addamax Corporation v. Open Software Found., 152 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 1998).
270
TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Telephone Co. 977 F. Supp. 2d 462 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
271
Golden Bridge v. Motorola, 547 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2008).
266
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as steel and plastic as appropriate materials for electrical conduit. Requiring a consensus between
plastic and steel makers would undermine that goal. Thus, the Court in Allied Tube did not require
that standards committees be balanced between competing commercial interests; but only that the
standardization process not be stacked in favor of one solution to the detriment of the other.
These disputes raise a concept of balance that differs from the “traditional” requirement to
balance the representation of vertically related interest groups. The perceived need to balance
representation between manufacturers and users of standardized goods chiefly resulted from a
recognition that any standard will only be used if it is acceptable to both of these groups. When
the interests of producers and users diverge, such as in the case of steel makers and railway
companies, a standardization process that only reflects the voices of users or producers would often
fail to achieve the necessary compromise between divergent interests.
By contrast, with respect to competitors proposing competing solutions for a particular
application, the success of the standard results from the fact that users may rely on the standard to
inform their adoption decisions.272 This necessary trust would be undermined by a process that is
lopsided in favor of a particular technical solution, such as a particular conduit material.
Nevertheless, a standard resulting from a commercial compromise between competing suppliers
of different solutions (e.g., an agreement to recommend electrical conduits with one coat of plastic
and one coat of steel), would similarly fail to gain the trust of the market. Rather, standardization
processes must offer a forum for the objective assessment of different technical solutions that is
unbiased with respect to the special interests of competing providers. An unbiased standardization
process should not exclude a technical solution merely to favor the interests of some participants.
This being said, it should also not withhold a technically justified choice merely to balance rivaling
special interests.
Balancing committee composition along interest categories may nevertheless support the
elimination of bias in the process. A committee stacked with representatives of a certain type of
producer (as in Allied Tube) is unlikely to be unbiased. In a balanced committee that includes an
adequate mix of representatives of different types of producers, users and other relevant interest
groups, any group of particular interests must convince a large group of others of the technical
merit of their proposed solution. The legitimacy of the process does not result from parity in the
representation of different types of competing producers, but from the fact that no group alone can
enact standardization decisions without the support of other constituencies that have no vested
interest in the competing solutions. While balancing representation by different interest categories
may thus foster an unbiased environment, balancing the representation of proponents of different
technical solutions within the same interest category is not required, as long as none of the
competing interests is in a position to dominate the process.
3.

IPR Policy Balance

Today, the most high-profile conflicts over SDO balance are not between suppliers of
competing technical solutions, but between patent-centric and product-centric firms. 273 As
272

E.g. builders relying on NFPA’s standards for choosing a fire-proof material for electrical conduit, or an industrial
customer relying on ASME’s “Boiler and Pressure Vessel (BPV) Code” when choosing a safe boiler control device
273
See note 165, supra, and accompanying text.
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discussed above, this debate has centered largely around “balance” in SDO intellectual property
policies, and allegations that one faction or the other has unfairly skewed SDO policies or decisions
toward the other faction’s preferred outcome.
Conflicts between patent- and product-centric interests may involve horizontal balance (or the
absence thereof), as patent- and product-centric solutions may compete in the process of standards
development. For the most part, however, the debate over IPR policy making signifies a return to
a vertical notion of balance, where balance is not intended to allow for unbiased consideration of
competing solutions, but to find a middle ground between the conflicting interests of different
commercial constituencies that are vertically related to each other through business relationships
that are impacted by an SDO’s decisions. Similar to the goal of balancing the interests of the
producers and users of standardized goods, some SDOs perceive this balance between the interests
of patent- and product-centric firms as important, as their policies need to garner support from
both groups of firms in order for their standards to succeed in the market.274
Societal balance has moved to the background in these debates. Consumer welfare is frequently
invoked – the sides arguing, respectively, that consumers are better off with lower-priced products
or greater incentives for new product innovation – yet few genuine consumer-oriented
organizations have taken an active part in the debate over IPR policies, which is being waged
largely between large industrial concerns with differing market strategies and goals.275 This is
similar to what has been observed in the context of cases such as Hydrolevel and Allied Tube,
which were waged between commercial stakeholders without significant participation by
consumer interest groups, even though the disputes were later used to justify policy proposals
intended to promote consumer representation.
In spite of these similarities, there are differences between IPR policy balance and stakeholder
balance requirements. Stakeholder balance requirements are concerned with a balanced
representation of different stakeholder constituencies in a standardization process. More recent
discussions of balance in the context of IPR policies emphasize both balance in policy substance
and balanced representation of patent- and product-centric firms in the process of developing IPR
policies.276 Neither of these dimensions is fully aligned with traditional balance requirements.
Several legal sources of SDO process balance requirements – such as ANSI’s Essential
Requirements, OMB Circular A-119, and ISO/IEC Guide 59:2019 – are explicitly limited to
processes for standards development, to the exclusion of processes for the development of SDO
274

Malcolm Johnson, Director of ITU’s Telecommunication Standardization Bureau, e.g. stated in 2014 “A wellbalanced IPR policy is likely to attract all types of stakeholders to the standardization process. However, if the IPR
policy overly favours patent holders, then the standard may not meet users’ needs, and not be readily implementable.
Similarly, if the IPR policy overly favours users, then patent holders may decide not to contribute their technology
to the standardization process”. ITU Telecommunication Standardization Bureau, Understanding patents,
competition & standardization in an interconnected world, 2014, at 55.
275
JRC Report, supra note 2, at 169.
276
For example, the DVB Forum was careful in developing its IPR policy in the mid-1990s to balance the leadership
of the subcommittees charged with developing an IPR policy between representatives of equipment manufacturers
and broadcasters, the two principal commercial constituencies involved in the market. Eltzroth, supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined., at 30. On the other hand, allegations have been made that the IEEE-SA process for
developing amendments to its IPR policy in 2015 lacked balanced representation among product- and patent-centric
firms. See, e.g., Sidak, supra note 165.
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policies. While many SDOs seek balanced representation of different interests [] in governance
processes, as evidenced by explicit balance requirements for boards at various European NSBs,277
these practices are not necessarily required by external regulations.
Legal sources requiring IPR policy balance – such as OMB Circular A-119 or the Horizontal
Guidelines of the European Commission – explicitly focus on the balanced nature of the policy
itself, i.e. a focus on a balanced outcome rather than a balanced policy development process. The
notion of policy balance (or balanced substance) is distinct from traditional requirements of
balanced representation and, as discussed above, does not find a parallel in the development of
technical standards themselves. Nevertheless, the substance of an SDO’s IPR policy (independent
of the policy development process) may affect participation in the standards development process,
and thus may indirectly affect (traditional) balanced representation of different stakeholder
constituencies in those processes.278
Independent of an SDO’s traditional balance requirements, there may be antitrust and
competition law implications for balance, or lack thereof, in the IPR policy development process.
Even before the Trump administration’s increased emphasis on IPR policies, the U.S. DOJ in its
original (2015) IEEE BRL recognized that a revision of an SDO’s IPR policy through an
unbalanced process may raise antitrust concerns.279

277

“At AFNOR, decisions in technical committees on standard development are never taken by vote, and are always
adopted by consensus. By contrast, AFNOR’s governance body, the Comité de coordination et de pilotage de la
normalisation (CCPN), and the board of directors of AFNOR can make decisions on rule changes by majority vote.
AFNOR explains this difference by noting that technical committees are open to everybody, whereas the CCPN and
board of directors have a clearly defined membership, which is balanced among different constituencies.” See JRC
Report, supra note 2, at 99.
278
During the Trump Administration, the U.S. DOJ repeatedly emphasized the relationship between IPR policy
balance and participation in the standards development process. For example, the DOJ stated in its 2020
supplemental letter relating to IEEE’s 2015 policy change: “Balance is therefore important not only to encourage
participation and competition among patent holders in the standard-setting process, but also to ensure more
significant antitrust concerns do not arise. The rules that govern standard setting activity should be unbiased in order
to maximize participation and to allow SDOs to achieve the best technical solutions in their standards.” DOJ IEEE
Update Letter, supra note 170 at 11. The DOJ’s 2018 letter to ANSI similarly cautioned that “If an SSO’s intellectual
property rights policy is too restrictive for one side or the other, it also risks deterring participation in procompetitive
standard setting.” DOJ ANSI Letter, supra note 170.
279
See DOJ 2015 IEEE Letter, supra note 173.
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Table 1
Different Types of SDO Balance Requirements
Type of
balance
Description

Vertical balance

Societal balance

Horizontal balance

Balance between vertically-related interest
groups (e.g. producers, users)

Balance between
competing
technological
solutions

Timeline

Since the 19th century;
dormant for 2nd half of
20th century;
Standardization in a
given SDO is used as a
means for one interest
group to collude to gain
an advantage over the
other, in a situation
where the standard is
compulsory or there is no
alternative to the SDO as
a forum for
standardization

Balance among
stakeholders (e.g.
consumers,
environmental
groups, employees)
Since the 1960s
Standardization is
used as a means for
industry to benefit
at the expense of
consumers, the
environment,
workers or other
societal interests

Standardization in a
given SDO is used as
a means for the
proponent(s) of one
technological solution
to exclude other
solutions without
objective (i.e.
technological)
justification, thus
skewing competition
between these
solutions in the
market
§ 1 or § 2 Sherman
Act; Art. 101 or 102
TFEU (depending on
the facts)
Ensure that
standardization is
carried out
objectively; absence
of dominance of
standardization
processes by a single
interest group
- Openness and
consensus
decision-making
- “Absence of
dominance” rules

Theory of
harm

Resurgence now in
context of IPR
policies
Policy development
in a given SDO is
used as a means for
one interest group
to collude to gain
an advantage over
the other, in a
situation where the
standard is
compulsory or there
is no alternative to
the SDO as a forum
for standardization

Antitrust /
competition
law provisions
at stake
Implication
for SDO
(baseline)

Primarily § 1 Sherman Act and Art. 101 TFEU

None

Ensure that interest
groups are represented
and cannot collude
against one another

In addition to
implication on the
left: ensure that
resulting policies
are balanced

Ensure that
stakeholders are
represented

More specific
initiatives
taken by
SDOs to
address
concern

-

In addition to
initiatives on the
left:
- Baseline IP
policy
(disclosure,
FRAND
commitment)

-

-

Balanced committee
composition (quota)
Assess support
within each interest
group
Documented
outreach
Consensus decisionmaking

-

Aim for
balance
amongst mix
of stakeholder
groups
Openness and
transparency
Support (e.g.
financial) for
the
representation
of certain
groups

Since the 1980s
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LEGAL AND POLICY REQUIREMENTS FOR BALANCE

Related to, but separate from, the question of which interests to balance is the question of what
SDOs should, or must, do in order to achieve the desired degree of balance among those competing
interests. A number of different approaches have emerged over the years that vary in terms of their
specificity and stringency – the degree to which different behaviors are prohibited or mandated.
Very generally, balance requirements fall into three categories: (1) requirements that individual
SDOs have voluntarily chosen to adopt; these requirements may be very stringent and specific; (2)
requirements that are imposed on only a set of SDOs with a privileged status in their country or
region, or requirements governing whether an SDO may qualify for certain advantages, such as
accreditation, government use of their standards, or antitrust liability protections; these
requirements are usually general and flexible; and (3) requirements that are mandatory for all
SDOs as a matter of law; these are even more general, and in both Europe and the U.S. there is
only limited guidance to define the substance of these requirements.
These categories are largely orthogonal to the distinctions between different types of balance
requirements discussed in Part V.A. Considerations of each of the different types of balance are
potentially relevant to the requirements voluntarily chosen by individual SDOs, requirements
applicable to specific SDOs or attached to specific advantages, and requirements generally
applicable to all. Nevertheless, some types of balance requirements are more relevant at different
levels than others. Societal balance, for example, is particularly relevant to specific SDOs with a
privileged status, such as NSBs and ESOs, and for SDOs’ standards to qualify for government use,
whereas general antitrust requirements and SDOs’ own traditional balance requirements are mostly
concerned with the balance between competing industry interests.
Similar to the distinction between different types of balance requirements, the distinction
between different levels of obligation is applicable in both Europe and the U.S. Government use
of industry standards is governed by different systems in the two regions. While Europe has a
system of official recognition of NSBs and ESOs, U.S. federal agencies are required under OMB
Circular A-119 to rely on voluntary consensus standards (i.e., developed under systems that
include balance).280 There are thus notable differences between Europe and the U.S. regarding the
second category of balance requirements, i.e. those applicable to certain SDOs or attached to
certain purposes; but there are few indications that the balance requirements voluntarily chosen by
individual SDOs or the balance obligations generally applicable to all SDOs fundamentally differ
between Europe and the U.S.
At one end of the spectrum, there are the very stringent, explicit and specific balancing
requirements of individual SDOs. SDOs such as ASTM and DVB, for example, categorize their
members in different categories, and numerically balance the representation of these categories for
voting purposes. These policies are imposed purely by choice of the SDO’s governing body as
representative of its membership.281 These specific balancing processes are clearly not required of
280

See, generally, Emily S. Bremer, American and European Perspectives on Private Standards in Public Law, 91
TUL. L. REV. 325 (2016).
281
See notes 25-26, supra, and accompanying text. In observing the practical operation of the mandatory quota
requirement at ASTM, Professor Robert Hamilton has noted that while formal voting committees at ASTM do,
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all SDOs. Some SDOs, such as IETF and W3C, intentionally forego formal balancing measures,
but seek to achieve stakeholder balance through open and transparent processes and procedures
(what we have termed “practical balance”).282 The interests that SDOs choose to balance are often
defined by the stakeholders that SDOs view as being critical for the success of their standards –
such as the different constituencies of DVB,283 and the IPR holders and implementers emphasized
by ETSI’s and ITU-T’s commitments to IPR policy balance.
At the second level, there are less stringent balance of interest requirements applicable to (a
large number of) specific SDOs. Private regulatory instruments define requirements for SDOs
seeking a certain privileged position, e.g. to develop ANSI-accredited American National
Standards, or to represent a country’s interests in ISO or IEC. Both ANSI’s Essential Requirements
and ISO/IEC Guide 59 define balance of interest requirements. The requirements defined by ANSI
and ISO/IEC, in their current formulations, are less specific than those implemented by individual
SDOs such as ASTM (which itself is ANSI-accredited). Nevertheless, these guidelines are
intended and designed to be enforceable. 284 The balance requirements of ANSI and ISO/IEC are
also less stringent than some individual SDOs’ balance requirements; in particular, they emphasize
an obligation to seek rather than to achieve balance. The “historical criteria” of balance, i.e.
numerical parity of representation of different constituencies on technical committees, are not
required by ANSI (even though it is viewed as usually achieving ANSI’s own balance
requirements), and discouraged by ISO/IEC. Individual SDOs may choose to offer more specific
balancing mechanisms; and may also choose to seek a desired level of balance exceeding the levels
required by ANSI or ISO/IEC.285 Both ANSI and ISO/IEC expect SDOs to seek a balance between
both traditional and societal interest categories.

indeed, hew to these quota requirements, much of the detailed standards-development work at ASTM is conducted
by smaller expert working groups that largely represent the industrial sector. Hamilton, Roles, supra note 26, at
1355. Quota requirements present challenges both in defining useful stakeholder categories and ensuring that
selected representatives of those categories actually represent the interests of other members of the category. Id.
What’s more, when categories include stakeholders who are diffuse or lack sufficient expertise or financial resources
to engage substantively in SDO deliberations, it is often difficult to secure their meaningful participation in SDO
activities. See JRC Report, supra note 2, at 121 (discussing balance in voting requirements at DVB Project and
ETSI). Finally, quotas themselves may unfairly skew SDO decision making when the representatives of very small
stakeholder groups are given the same voting privileges as representatives of much larger or more technically or
economically significant groups. As such, it is not clear that mandatory quota requirements actually achieve their
goals, or that such goals are even attainable in a practical sense. Hamilton, Roles, supra note 26, at 1354-55.
Nevertheless, they remain important both historically and in numerous SDO policies today.
282
See Part x, supra.
283
The four constituencies are: Content providers and broadcasters; infrastructure providers and network operators;
manufacturers and software suppliers; and governments and national regulatory bodies.
284
The ANSI Balance Guidance, supra note 143, specifies that “ASDs must retain documentation that demonstrates
appropriate outreach efforts to solicit a balanced consensus body.” The ISO membership manual lists “Procedures”,
“Review”, and “Business Plans” as “typical evidence” to establish that committees represent a balance of interests.
Furthermore, “Forms – voting records”; “Membership data – reports”; and “Minutes of meetings” are considered
“typical evidence” to assess representivity or balance of a committee, working group or mirror committee; ISO
Membership
Manual,
2015;
at
21.
https://www.iso.org/files/live/sites/isoorg/files/archive/pdf/en/iso_membership_manual.pdf
285
Using the terminology of the JRC Report, these would be “baseline-plus” policies. See JRC Report, supra note
2, at 145-46.
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In addition to these requirements defined by private organizations, there are legal obligations
applicable to specific SDOs, including Regulation 1025/2012 in Europe, and national regulations
in some European countries. These legal requirements are the result of formal government
recognition by institutions of the European Union or national governments of European countries,
for which there is no equivalent in the U.S. These instruments often require SDOs to seek societal
balance, i.e. allow for sufficient representation of potentially under-represented stakeholder groups
and interests, such as consumers, environmental groups, workers, etc; but provide few or no
provisions on balance of interests between different groups of industry stakeholders. At least in
the view of European policy makers, this emphasis on under-represented societal stakeholder
groups is a defining characteristic of the European approach to standardization.
Furthermore, some legal instruments provide benefits to SDOs that offer a specified level of
balance of interests. In the U.S., OMB Circular A-119 and the SDOAA apply to SDOs offering
balanced deliberative processes. Neither the Circular nor the SDOAA impose mandatory legal
requirements on SDOs or their members. Rather, they create optional sets of criteria that SDOs
may adhere to if they wish to take advantage of the benefits offered by those regulatory and
statutory schema. The Circular establishes which SDO-developed standards are suitable for federal
government use in its procurement and regulatory functions, and the SDOAA establishes a safe
harbor from certain antitrust liability for SDOs that elect to comply with its requirements.286 In
Europe, Annex II of Regulation 1025/2012 allows the use of certain standards for public
procurement, requiring inter alia a balance of interests in the standards development process.
Similar to OMB Circular A-119, this does not define an obligation of the SDO, but directs
government agencies to use only standards developed by SDOs complying with these criteria.
In addition to being non-binding, balance requirements attached to these statutory or regulatory
benefits are very general, and there is no clear mechanism to assess whether SDOs meet the
requirements. In the EU, it is the role of the Multi-Stakeholder Platform (MSP) to determine
whether individual standards comply with the criteria of Annex II, but the MSP does not accredit
or evaluate SDOs or their processes. In the United States, there has been a conscious policy choice
against systematic government review or accreditation of private SDOs or their standards. Certain
benefits under the SDOAA are predicated on an open registration system. In NSS, the US DOJ
urged the court to test whether AMSTO complied with the procedural requirements underlying the
SDOAA, but the antitrust complaint was dismissed before any substantive adjudication of these
issues.287
Given the generality of these requirements and the scarcity of formal reviews of SDO
processes, the specific degree of balance that they require remains open to interpretation. The rules
generally emphasize openness as a condition of balance. The earliest formulation of OMB Circular
A-119 as well as Annex II of Regulation 1025/2012 furthermore call on SDOs to “invite” or “seek”
participation from diverse parties or interest groups, echoing ANSI’s requirement of active
outreach. The current version of the Circular, calling for “meaningful participation from a broad
range of parties” and prohibiting dominance by a single interest, seems to be more open, and

286

As noted above, compliance with the SDOAA triggers use of the “rule of reason” approach to antitrust analysis
and excludes treble damages for an antitrust violation.
287
NSS Labs, Inc. v. Crowdstrike, Inc., Case No. 3:18-cv-05711 (N.D. Cal., filed Sep. 18, 2018).
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appears intended to encompass both ANSI’s definition of balance, as well as SDOs that rely on
general openness and transparency for stakeholder balance.288
The balance requirements encapsulated in OMB Circular A-119 (and by extension the
SDOAA) and the trajectory of European standardization regulation leading to the current
formulation of Regulation 1025 largely emanate from an external critique of the effective power
of private SDOs by advocates of consumers, small businesses, and environmental interests. At
least historically, these requirements are thus primarily associated with societal balance.
Nevertheless, over time, their scope has been extended to encompass e.g. IPR policy balance.
Another source of balance requirements is international trade law. The very general balance
requirement under the TBT Agreement, most specifically defined by the TBT Committee decision
of 2000, is part of the TBT’s “Code of Good Practice”.289 The Code of Good Practice “is open to
acceptance by any standardizing body within the territory of a Member of the WTO”, and does not
constitute any direct obligation for private SDOs. Countries that are member of the TBT agreement
“shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure that local government
and non-governmental standardizing bodies within their territories […] accept and comply with
this Code of Good Practice”; a requirement applicable to their respective standardization
regulations as outlined above.
At the third level, competition law defines a minimum level of balance required of all SDOs.
To a large degree, SDOs allow competitors to come together to engage in behavior that replaces
market competition. As such, this collective behavior must be policed by antitrust and competition
law. As recently noted by the U.S. DOJ, “Without the disciplining effect of competition,
collaboratively set standards may serve the interests of the most powerful participants in the
process, to the detriment of consumers. … [T]he standard-setting process may risk anticompetitive
outcomes, if proper safeguards are not practiced by the standard setting organization to ensure that
the participants represent the market interests as a whole.” 290
These required safeguards comprise an obligation to ensure at least some level of stakeholder
balance during standards development. Clearly, the intentional unbalancing of SDO deliberations
– “stacking the private standard-setting body with decisionmakers sharing their economic interest
in restraining competition” (Allied Tube) – is sanctionable under the antitrust laws. This is a
minimum requirement for all SDOs – facilitating an intentional imbalance in SDO decision making
processes in view of restraining competition is prohibited to all.
There are some indications that in addition to refraining from intentionally biasing the process,
SDOs may also have to undertake at least some active steps to provide for a certain minimum level
288

The Discussion and Responses to Significant Comments provided along the revised OMB Circular A-119 in 2016
reveals the ambivalence of the Circular’s definition of balance. The OMB explains that it intended its definition of
balance to be “consistent” with ANSI’s Essential Requirements (which differentiate balance from dominance); while
also expressing agreement with other commenters stating that “a key objective of ‘balance’ is preventing a single
interest from dominating the decision-making process.” OMB Circular A-119 (2016), Supplementary Material,
Discussion and Responses to Significant Comments, at 9. This underscores the OMB’s intention for the definition
to “allow for flexibility how balance is determined.”
289
See notes x, supra, and accompanying text.
290
DOJ GSMA Letter, supra note 172, at 4.
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of balance. In ASME v. Hydrolevel, the Supreme Court recognized the general principle that SDOs
may be liable for anticompetitive conduct of SDO participants, as the SDO itself is best positioned
to adopt procedures that minimize the risk of anticompetitive conduct.291 Nevertheless, it did not
elaborate on what specific procedures SDOs must adopt or possess in order to prevent violations
of antitrust laws. In its Final Staff Report of 1983, 292 the FTC built on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Silver v New York Stock Exchange293 to develop some general procedural principles
required of any standardization process capable of producing restrictive effects, including notice,
the opportunity to file a complaint to the SDO, and the right to a written response.294 In Allied
Tube, the Supreme Court affirmed that “private standard-setting by associations comprising firms
with horizontal and vertical business relations is permitted at all under the antitrust laws only on
the understanding that it will be conducted in a nonpartisan manner offering procompetitive
benefits”.295 Overall, the acceptability of SDOs under antitrust laws is premised on a minimum
level of due process and lack of bias, which may be compromised by extreme imbalances in the
representation of different interests. Nevertheless, there is no general definition of what minimum
balance level is generally required of SDOs, and especially in the United States, there has been a
conscious policy choice against providing such a general definition.
It is clear however that the traditional (“historical”) balance requirements practiced by some
SDOs, the institutional norms embodied in the requirements of ANSI, CEN, and ISO/IEC, or
regulatory instruments conferring specific advantages to certain SDOs (such as OMB Circular A119, the SDOAA, Regulation 1025, and the European Commission’s Horizontal Guidelines) are
not compulsory as a matter of competition or antitrust law. Providing for balance in line with these
more specific (and potentially more stringent) requirements is often seen as helpful for SDOs to
comply with their basic obligations under competition law; it may confer a presumption of
compliance; and offer protection against liability of the SDO for abuses committed by individual
participants. However, failure to comply with any of these requirements alone is not an antitrust
or competition law violation.
The minimum level of balance required of all SDOs as a matter of competition law thus falls
somewhere between the abusive and clearly illegal tactics alleged in Allied Tube – packing the
room with unqualified voters, paying for individuals to attend SDO meetings solely for the purpose
of voting, and otherwise corrupting the legitimate deliberative process – and the general and
flexible affirmative balance requirements attached to Circular A-119, the SDOAA, Regulation
1025, and the Horizontal Guidelines.
It seems likely that the minimal balance requirements under generally applicable antitrust laws
vary from one SDO to the other. The Supreme Court decisions in Hydrolevel and Allied Tube
concerned safety standards – a set of standards for which an imbalance in the representation of
different interests has traditionally been seen as particularly problematic (as evidenced e.g. by the
distinction historically made in this regard by ANSI). Also, in both these cases, the originally
voluntary standards developed by private SDOs acquired binding effects, e.g. through their
291

456 U.S. at x.
FTC 1983 Report, supra note 82.
293
373 U.S. 341 (1963).
294
See supra note x.
295
Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at x.
292
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influence on governmental regulation. The effective power that SDOs such as NFPA and ASME
wield over entire industries warrants particular antitrust scrutiny;296 but also sets these SDOs apart
from numerous smaller and less established consortia that are arguably less capable of producing
restrictive effects. The Horizontal Guidelines of the European Commission operate a similar
distinction between different SDOs, noting that “in the absence of market power, a standardisation
agreement is not capable of producing restrictive effects on competition.” Only those SDOs
capable of producing restrictive effects are invited to adopt certain standardization process
principles (such as a balanced IPR policy) in order to benefit from the Horizontal Guidelines’ safe
harbor provisions.
The U.S. DOJ’s 2019 investigation of GSMA sheds additional light on the balance
requirements applicable to all SDOs as a matter of antitrust law. 297 In this matter, the
standardization process criticized by the DOJ appeared to be unbalanced, offering one class of
companies (operators) privileges and influence over the standardization process that were not
available to other GSMA members (technology providers). Unlike Allied Tube, however, this
imbalance allegedly resulted from members’ exercise of their rights under the SDO’s unbalanced
policies, rather than the collusion of some SDO members to usurp the standardization process.
Even though GSMA is not bound by any specific balance requirements other than those applicable
to all SDOs, it accepted the DOJ’s demand to revise its policies and balance the rights of its
operator and other members, thus highlighting the potential for antitrust enforcement to correct
imbalances in standardization processes beyond those resulting from clearly illegal tactics
violating the letter and the spirit of the SDO’s own policies.298
A similar spectrum of requirements defines the concept of “policy balance” and the balancing
of interests among “patent-centric” and “product-centric” firms. Individual SDOs have chosen –
sometimes encouraged or directed by regulatory authorities – to require their IPR policy to balance
these competing interests. Furthermore, regulatory instruments reserve certain advantages to SDOs
offering balanced IPR policies, such as the competition law safe harbors provided by the SDOAA
and the European Commission’s Horizontal Guidelines, and the regulatory advantages offered by
OMB Circular A-119 and Regulation 1025. In contrast, the general requirements applicable to all
SDOs as a matter of general antitrust and competition law are significantly less stringent and less
specific. That being said, as in the case of balance of representation, SDOs that wish to impose
greater degrees of balance between different categories of industrial producers may do so, so long
as those requirements do not themselves amount to abusive or anticompetitive practices.

296

“ASME wields great power in the Nation's economy. Its codes and standards influence the policies of numerous
States and cities. […] ASME can be said to be "in reality, an extragovernmental agency which prescribes rules for
the regulation and restraint of interstate commerce."” Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 570.
297
See DOJ GSMA Letter, supra note 172.
298
See id.
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Table 2 below summarizes the range of different SDO balance requirements based on these
observations.
Table 2
Legal and Policy Requirements for SDO Balance
Tier
1

Balance Requirement
Lack of bias

Description
Prohibits “stacking” SDO
processes with stakeholders
sharing an interest in stifling
competition and otherwise
biasing process
No single interest should
dominate the standardization
process

Examples
Allied Tube,
GSMA

Applies to
All SDOs

2

Non-domination

SDOAA,
OMB Circular
A-119

SDOs wishing to take
advantage of statutory
benefits under SDOAA
and OMB Circular A-119
Any SDO wishing to
adopt an open door
policy; SDOs seeking for
their standards to be
recognized as state of the
art
SDOs that wish to be
accredited by ANSI;
SDOs formally
recognized by certain
European governmental
bodies

3

Practical Balance

SDO processes are
practically balanced; e.g.
because of openness to any
interested party and
consensus decision-making

IETF,
OpenStand
principles

4

Obligation to seek
balance

SDO must take affirmative
steps to ensure balance

5

Numerical balance (e.g.
quotas)

SDO voting committees
must satisfy numerical
balance requirements (or
majority approval by each
interest category is required)

6

Policy balance

SDO policies should reflect
a balanced treatment of
different stakeholders
categories (e.g., patentcentric and product-centric)

ANSI
Essential
Requirements;
BSI MoU;
CEN Guide 4;
Regulation
1025
ASTM; DVB;
Governance
bodies of
certain
European
NSBs
ETSI;
DG COMP
Horizontal
Guidelines;
OMB Circular
A-119

SDOs that desire
sufficiently equal
representation by
identified stakeholder
categories
SDOs seeking to offer a
balanced IPR policy;
SDOs wishing to benefit
from Safe Harbor under
EU Competition Law and
regulatory benefits under
OMB Circular A-119
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CONCLUSION

Balance in SDO decision making is an expected and important aspect of collaborative
standardization. Our historical review of international law, US law and EU law allows us to
distinguish between different types of balancing requirements. ‘Traditional’ balancing concerns
the industrial interests involved in standardization. Within it, a distinction can be made between
vertical balancing – where an SDO must avoid that interest groups collude within the SDO to gain
an advantage over others, whether in standardization or policymaking processes – and horiztonal
balancing, where the proponents of one technological solution use the SDO to exclude competing
solutions without justification. Next to these two dimensions of traditional balancing, ‘societal’
balancing has also emerged as a concern: it is defined as the balance amongst a broader set of
stakeholders, including not only industry, but also consumers, workers and environmental groups,
among others.
Antitrust and competition law are concerned with ‘traditional’ balancing, both vertical and
horizontal. At some level, they impose constraints on biased SDO processes. But SDOs may
select, based on their individual policy preferences, risk aversion and stakeholder composition,
what degree of balance they wish to enforce above baseline legal requirements. Some SDOs, such
as IETF, may desire to impose no such balance requirements, relying instead on openness and
transparency to ensure a fair and legitimate process – what we term “practical balance”. SDOs that
wish their standards to be adopted by U.S. federal agencies or used for public procurement
purposes in the U.S. and Europe must comply with the general and flexible balance requirements
of OMB Circular A-119 and Regulation 1025/2012; and those that wish to benefit from the liability
protections of the SDOAA must do the same. Those that wish to be accredited by ANSI must
adhere to the affirmative balancing obligations set forth in its Essential Requirements, and other,
similarly affirmative obligations apply to NSBs representing their countries in ISO or IEC. Some
SDOs, such as ASTM and DVB, impose strict numerical balancing mechanisms such as quotas on
participation by different interest groups. The latest debates over SDO balance involves the
processes for developing SDO IPR policies and whether balance should be sought between patentand product-centric stakeholders. The antitrust implications of this dimension of SDO balance are
subject to debates that are still in their early stages.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3806876

